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I. INTRODUCTION

Graham v. Fl,orida, 1 the Supreme Court's 2010 decision finding
a life without parole sentence for a non-homicide crime committed
by a juvenile "cruel and unusual' ' has rightly been recognized as a
"watershed." 2 A major focus of the extensive commentary on the
case has been on its application of the "evolving standards of
decency'' test to a punishment outside of the death penalty, and to
whether Graham might apply also to adults. 3 Equally important
in Graham, but subject to comparatively less critical attention,4 is
the central role that the rehabilitative theory of punishment plays
in its holding both as a matter of rhetoric and as a matter of
substance. A sentence to imprisonment without the possibility of
parole for Graham, the Court explained, would foreswear
"altogether the rehabilitative ideal," which was unacceptable. 6
"Life in prison without the possibility of parole," Justice Kennedy
wrote for the Court, "gives no chance for fulfillment outside prison
walls, no chance for reconciliation with society, no hope."6 "This,"
1

560 U.S. 48 (2010).

See, e.g., Richard A. Bierschbach, Proportionality and Parole 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1745,
1746 (2012) (Graham as a "watershed"); id. at n.2 (Graham a "landmark").
3 See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Graham Lets the Sun Shine In: The
Supreme Court Opens a Window &tween Thio Formerly Walled-Off Approaches to Eighth
(2010) ("Does
Amendmtnt Proportionality Challenges, 23 FED. SENT'o REP. 79, 7 0
Graham invite reconsideration of the Court's extraordinary deference embodied in its
2

proportionality review or all noncapital sanctions, including term-of-years sentences short or
life imprisonment[?) . . . Does Graham provide greater protection to adults es well es
juveniles?"); Rachel E. Barkow, Categorizing Graham, 23 FED. SENT'G REP. 49, 49-61 (2010)
(asking whether the Court will extend Graham to non-capital cases, end if so, how far); Eva
S. Nilsen, From Harmelin to Grahem-Ju,lice Kennedy Stakes Out a Path to Proportional
Punishment, 23 FED. SENT'G REP. 67, 67 (2010) (discuB&ing what Graham might mean for
the future or proportionality analysis and individualized sentencing).
Other commentators have speculated on whether Graham means the Court is
abandoning some or all of ita "evolving standards of decency" test. See Youngjae Lee, The
Purposes of Punishment Test, 23 FED. SENT'O REP. 58, 59-60 (2010) (suggesting that a post•
Graham framework might make the culpability test the primary test); John F. Stinneford,
Evolving Away from Euoluing Standards of Decency 23 FED. SENT'o REP. 87, 87 (2010)
(asserting that Graham and several other recent cases indicate that the Court is
"prepare[dl to leave the evolving standards of decency test behind''); Ian P. Farrell,
Abandoning Objective Indicia, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 303, 304 (2013) (noting that the
Court's Miller v. Alabama decision signals that the Court is abandoning an "objective
indicia analysis").
• Bue see infra notes 164, 186-88 and accompanying text.
6 Graham, 560 U.S. at 74.
e Id. at 79.
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he concluded, "the Eighth Amendment does not permit" at least
when dealing with those under the age of eighteen. 7 The state
must "give defendants like Graham some meaningful opportunity
to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation. "8
What is rehabilitation, and what does it mean to have it as an
ideal? Francis Allen in his major work on the subject, The Decline
of the Rehabilitatiue Ideal (from which Justice Kennedy
consciously or unconsciously borrowed the phrase 9), noted that
rehabilitation was an inherently complex term, filled with
ambiguities. 10 Moreover, as the title to Allen's book reveals,
rehabilitation was, as early as the 1970s, being abandoned as a
primary justification for punishment and viewed with skepticism
as any part of the justification for punishment. 11 Kennedy's use of
rehabilitation was not merely BUl'prising in the context of a
Supreme Court opinion, where more attention is usually paid to
retributive and deterrent theories; 12 it was surprising in the
context of punishment theory and practice more generally. 13 The
7 Id.
• Id. at 76 (emphasis added).
9 The first use seems to be in Francia A. Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the
Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CRlM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 226, 226 (1969) (defining
the "essential points" of this deal). See also FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 25--41 (1964) (describing the rehabilitative ideal and analyzing its
contours); Fred Cohen, Sentencing, Probation, ond the Rehabilitative Ideal: The View from
Mempa v. Rhay, 47 TEX. L. REV. 1, 35 (1968) (describing the consequences of a
rehabilitative ideal theory, including, for example, revocation of probation i f the offender
does not reintegrate into society).
10 FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABilJTATIVE IDEAL 2 (1981) (1'he
rehabilitative ideal concept requires description and amplification. I t is not surprising to
discover that the phrase embraces great complexity and, indeed, encompaeses widely
different and even conflicting kinds of social policies."); id at 62 ("Ambiguities affiict the
very notion o f what rehabilitation consists."); see also United States v. Williams, 793 F.3d
1064, 1066 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.) ("{C]ritically the defendant misses the ambiguity in
the term 'rehabilitation' (more precisely, 'correctional rehabilitation') as used in discussions
of criminal punishment.").
11 ALLEN, supra note 10, at 5-7 (explaining the nearly "unchallenged sway o f the
rehabilitative ideal" in the mid,twentieth century and describing ita decline in the 1970s);
cf. FRANCIS T. CULLEN & KAREN E. GILBERT, REAFFIRMING REHABWTATION 67, 149 (2d ed.
2013) (explaining the decline of the rehabilitative ideal in the 1970a and arguing that
current reform measures should reaffirm rehabilitation).
i i See e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 967, 989 (1991) (mentioning rehabilitation
only in passing, and dismissively).
13 Casebooks and treatises by and large treat rehabilitation as at best a failure in
practice and at worst a £ailed ideal. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY,
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punishment literature and the literature on Graham has not yet
come to grips with the full implication of the Graham decision
because it has incompletely understood the meanings of
"rehabilitation." 14
This Article gives an overview of the Supreme Court•s
engagement with the "rehabilitative ideal" in Graham as well as
two other recent cases. In the first part, I sketch three broad
models of that ideal: rehabilitation as treatment. rehabilitation as
training, and rehabilitation as reform. The first, "rehabilitation as
treatment," is. in its most familiar variant, the most ambitious. I t
suggests nothing less than a complete overhaul of both the theory
and practice of criminal justice by redefining crime as a "sickness"
and punishment as a "cure." 16 I t is this version that has suffered
the greatest decline over the past half century even though i t did
(at one point) strongly influence Supreme Court doctrine. 16 The
second model. rehabilitation as training, is less ambitious, and for
perhaps that reason, has endured as a part of sentencing. 17 I t too,
however. has been the object of vigorous critique. The third model,
rehabilitation as reform, has been prominent in philosophical
discussions of punishment and less on display in legal doctrine and
practice. 18 But it is this model that may best explain the use of
rehabilitative theory in Graham. 19
The second and third parts of the Article move from
rehabilitative theory to legal practice. I n two cases decided in
2011, Tapia v. United States 20 and Pepper v. United States, 21 the
Supreme Court has considered the use of rehabilitation in

CASES AND MATERlALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 37 (6th ed. 2012) (''The conventional wisdom ia
that past effort& to rehabilitate convicted offenders were mostly unsuccessful.;; id. at 38
("Even assuming that rehabilitative measures work, can you think of any moral objection to
rehabilitation a11a justification for imposing puniahment?j.
u For early efforts to grasp the meaning or Graham which I em indebted to, see generally
Cara H. Drinan, Graham on the Ground, 87 WASH. L. REV. 51 (2012) and Alice Riatroph,
Hope, Imprisonment, and the Constitution, 23 FED. SENT'G REP. 75 (2010).
16 See infra Part II.A.
1e See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) ("Reformation and
rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence.").
11 See infra Part ll.B.
•• See infra Part 11.c.
11 See infra Part IV.c.
20 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011).
21 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011).
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sentencing under the Sentencing Reform Act. 22 The cases point in
superficially opposite directions (Tapia opposes rehabilitation as a
factor to be used in extending a prison term;23 Pepper allows
consideration of rehabilitation in resentencing24) , but both testify
to the Court's wrestling with the role (both positive and negative)
that rehabilitation should have in sentencing. These cases are
important, but have been almost universally ignored in the
literature on sentencing. 25 Ultimately, they are testament to the
prevailing anti-rehabilitative trend in both legislative and judicial
fora.
The third part of the Article is devoted almost wholly to
Graham, the first Supreme Court case in decades to rely heavily
on the rehabilitative theory of punishment in its reasoning. It is
no exaggeration to say that without depending on rehabilitation,
the Court could not have concluded the way it did in Graham.
Rehabilitation is in many ways the key to the Graham opinion, but
Justice Kennedy's opinion is frustratingly unclear as to what he
means by rehabilitation or the rehabilitative ideal. 28 While some
elements of Kennedy's opinion imply rehabilitation as treatment,
and his concern that juveniles in prison have access to vocational
and education programs suggests rehabilitation as training, the
best interpretation of rehabilitation in Graham is as a case that
treats rehabilitation as requiring a kind of moral reform in the
offender. Understanding better what kind of rehabilitation
22 Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2390; Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1247.
23 See Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2391 ("Section 3582(a) precludes sentencing courts from
imposing or lengthening a prison term to promote an oll'ender's rehabilitation.").
i• See Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1241 ("[A) diatri«:t court may consider evidence of a
defendant's rehabilitation since his prior sentencing . . . . ").
" The main exception is Professor Douglaa Berman's posts on Sentencmg Law and
Policy. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, The Interesting Issues Raised by Tapia, the New
S C O T U S Federal Sentencing Case, SENTENCING LAW & POLICY (Dec. 14, 2010, 5:43 PM),
http://aentencing.typepad.com/sentencing.Jaw_and_policy/20 l 0112/the•interesting-issues•rai
sed-by-tapia-the•new•scotus-federal-sentencing-caae.html (asserting that "Tapio could be
the sentencing sleeper of the current SCOTUS term"); Douglas A. Berman, Pepper
Providing a Bit of Spice to S C O T U S Sentencing Docket, SENTENCING LAW & POLICY (Aug.
26, 2010, 9:47 PM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2010/08/pepp
er•providing-a-bit-of-spice•to•scotue-sentencing-docket.html (quoting a discussion of the case
in Marcin Coyle, Brief of the Week: Conflict Over Rehabilitation and Sentencing, NAT'L L.J.
(Aug. 25, 2010), available at http://www.nationalawjoumal.com/id=l202470986U6?s/retur
n=20141114140207).
29 See infra Part IV.A-B (highlighting Graham's discussion of rehabilitation and
describing its two models of rehabilitation).
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Kennedy was after in Graham helps us better understand how to
apply Graham in future cases and shows us the limitations of that
decision. Graham's model of rehabilitation as reform is in many
ways a conservative vision (in several senses of that word), but not
one without potential to change sentencing in ways small and
large. 27

II.

THREE MODELS OF REHABILITATION

Rehabilitation has a long history as a part of punishment
theory, but my purpose here is not to recount that history. Others
have done it ably, charting rehabilitation's rise in the midtwentieth century and its rapid decline into near irrelevance. 28
Early rehabilitationists had high hopes that punishment and
prison could change into something different than they were, but
those hopes swiftly came crashing down: empiricists questioned
whether rehabilitation could ever work (offenders sent to prison
seemed not to benefit from vocational and educational programs:
when released from prison, they fell back into a life of crime) and
theorists attacked what they saw as rehabilitation's unappealing
presuppositions (that prisoners were not evil, but merely "sick"
and needed to be held indefinitely so they could be "cured" by the
state). By the 1980s, if not sooner, many were wondering how we
could have ever thought prison could be a place for rehabilitation

i, See infra Part IV.c (applying this theory to the length of punishments, prison
conditions, and adults).
11&See generally ALLEN, supra note 10; KATE STITH & JOSE CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING:
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 9-37 (1998) (describing the history or
Cederal criminal sentencing); Douglas A Berman, Conceptualizing Booker, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
387 (2006) (locating the Supreme Court's United States 11. Booker decision on sentencing
guidelines within the history of sentencing rerorm); Meghan J . Ryan, Science and the New
Rehabilitation, 2 VA. J. CRIM. L. (Corthcoming 2015), auailable al http://ssm.com/abstract=2
019368; Michael Vitiello, Rec:011.Sidering Rehabilitation, 65 TuL. L. REV. 1011 (1991). A very
brief version or the story figures importantly in Justice Roberta's dissent in Miller. See
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2478 (2012) ("In this case, there is little doubt about the
direction or society's evolution: For most or the 20th century, American sentencing practices
emphasized rehabilitation or the olfender and the availability of parole. But by the 1980's,
outcry against repeat offenders, broad disaffection with the rehabilitative model, and other
factors led many legislatures to reduce or eliminate the possibility of parole, imposing
longer sentences in order to punish criminals and prevent them from committing more
crimes.").
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rather than purely a place for suffering and punishment. 29 In
broad outline, the shape of the story should be familiar and parts
of the history will inevitably creep into my analysis.
What I want to do here is to isolate three models of the
rehabilitative ideal which have had particular influence over the
last one hundred or so years in American law. In order to
understand why the rehabilitative ideal was in decline, we need to
be straight that the rehabilitative ideal was not a single thing; it
was plural. Moreover, some of the rehabilitative models were
more modest than others and each model came in different
varieties as well, which also ran from the modest to the ambitious.
The models are not completely discrete, of course, and at points
they can blend into one another. Indeed, in some respects, the
models are not mutually exclusive: one can believe that several
kinds of rehabilitation can go on at once and that the state should
he interested in all of them. Nonetheless, I believe they are
separate enough to be called different "models" because, in rough
outline, they have distinguishing features and characteristics.
I start with the model that, in the minds of many, was almost
thoroughly discredited in theory and that never really took hold in
practice. At the same time, traces of its influence continue to this
day.3o
A. REHABILITATION AS TREATMENT
At its most extreme, the rehabilitative ideal was not merely to
supplement or revise punishment, it was to replace punishment
with something else, something more humane. "Crime" and
,
"punishmentt were crude, primitive ideas 31 and had "no place in
the scientific vocabulary."32 The more rational and enlightened
perspective was to treat crime as an illness that needed to be
treated. Jailers and judges were out; doctors and therapists were
29

S u Miller,

132 S. Ct. at 2478 (explaining how by that time, legislatures began reducing

or eliminating the possibility of parole).

:,o See infra Part lll.B (discussing Pepper and its relation to certain tenets of
rehabilitation as treatment).
31 See Cesare Beccaria, On. Crimes and Punishments, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 11821 (Stanley E. Grupp ed., 1971).
31 Karl Menninger, Therapy, Not Punishment, in PuNISHMENT AND THE DEATH PENALTY 47
(Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1995).
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in. 33 They had the necessary expertise to guide a person away
from his criminal, antisocial behavior and to reenter society: they
could dia g n osis the causes of the illness and recommend a course
of action. 34 ''The management of such [penal] institutions must be
scientific," one rehabilitation as treatment theorist wrote, "and the
care of their inmates must be scientific, since a grave crime is
always a manifestation of the pathological condition of the
individual."36
On the therapeutic version of rehabilitation, crime was most of
all a signal to the criminological experts that a person needed not
punishment, but treatment-in the way that a rash or a cold
might be a si g n al to doctors that care and attention were needed. 36
How much treatment, and for how long, was up to the expert.
When treatment was completed, the "prisoner, like the doctor's
other patients, should emerge . . . a different person, differently
equipped, differently functioning, and headed in a different
direction from when he began the treatment." 37 At the limit, if the
offender could not successfully reenter society, experts would be
able to treat him in a clinical setting to allow him a comfortable
and protective (if forever confined) existence. 38
The therapeutic ideal of rehabilitation seemed to many t.o be
naively optimistic in its assumptions39: that the causes of crime
33 See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 163 (1967) (analogizing criminal offenders t.o
patients).
:M See, e.a., Henry Weihofen, Punishmentand Treatment:Rehabilitation,in THEORJES OF
PUNISHMENT, supra note 31, at 26�56 C'Human behavior is the product of antecedent
causes. These causes can be identified, and i t is the function of the scientist to discover and
describe them. Knowledge of the antecedents of human behavior is essential for scientific
control of that behavior."); Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, in THEORIES OF
PUNISHMENT, supra note 31, at 82-84, 87 (discussing rehabilitation as treatment).
36 Enrico Ferri, The Positiue School of Criminology: Remedies, in THEORIES OF
PUNISHMENT, supra note 31, at 236.
:ie Karl Menninger, The Crime of Punishment:Laue Against Hate, in THEORIES OF
PUNISHMENT, supra note 31, at 246 ("I would say that according to the prev(a}lent
understanding of the words, crime is not a disease. Neither is i t an illness, although I think
i t should be! I t should be treated, and i t could be; but i t mostly isn't . . . . ").
37 Id. at 246-47.
n Id. at 252.
3 9 See, e.g., Shepard v. Taylor, 656 F.2d 648, 660 (2d Cir. 1977) C'The instant controversy
arises out of the recent tendency to reject the so-called 'rehabilitative ideal' as a relic of an
earlier, more optimistic, era and to return to traditional criteria of retribution and
deterrence in punishing juvenile ofrenders.'l

2015}

THE REHABILITATNE IDEAL

391

could be diagnosed, that a cure could be administered, and that we
could do away with "punitiveness" of punishment. We are much
less sanguine now. 40
But philosophers and policy-makers
responding to rehabilitation as treatment at the time (and they
were legion) saw something much more sinister; they did not
object to rehabilitation as treatment as impractical. They rejected
the ideal of rehabilitation as treatment altogether qua ideal. 41
They saw a worldview that treated human beings less as agents
and more as patients who could be hospitalized or imprisoned and
"treated" indefinitely, not for the safety of society, but supposedly
"for their own good."
In addition, there was something dehumanizing about being
told that your crime was not a free act but instead a sickness. Not
only was this factually incorrect (criminals had not "come down"
with anything42), it was dangerous. Novels such as Clockwork
Orange and One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest described the
frightful implications of a society run by experts where one's
freedom depended on convincing doctors and nurses that you had
been successfully "cured."43 There was something simpler and
clearer, i f not more ennobling, about saying that one was being
punished because one deserved it (it was a matter of justice) or
that society needed to lock you up to protect itself. 44 These
theories did not carry with them the implication that you were
somehow diseased or sick and in need of a doctor's care. They
40 See the analysis or the optimism of early rehabilitative theories in ALLEN, supra note
10, at 12-14. A t the same time, there is a good CBBe to be made tha_!; pockets of the criminal
justice system still adhere to aome version of the rehabilitation as treatment ideal: drug
treatment programs, for instance, or those dealing with mentally ill inmates, might have ae
their goal the care and rehabilitation of offenders. The point in the main text is simply that
i t is not the case that the paradigm for the criminal justice system as a whole is
rehabilitation as treatment.
41 For powerful philosophical criticism about the assumptions and prescriptions of
rehabilitation as treatment, see, inter alia, Richard Wasaerstrom, Puni&hment 11.
Rehabilitation, iii PUNISHMENT AND THE DEATH PENAL'l'Y, supra note 32, at 52; C.S. Lewis,
The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, in TiiEORIES or PUNISHMENT, supra note 31, at
301; Morrie, supra note 34, a t 76.
42 See, e.g., MARV1N E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 90 (1973)
("Many convicted criminals . • . . are not driven by, or 'acting out,' neurotic or psychotic
impulses. Instead, they have coldly and deliberately figured the odds . , . .'1.
43 See generallyANTHONY BURGESS, CLOCKWORK ORANGE (1962); KEN KEsEY, ONE FLEW
OVER THE CUCKOO'S NEST (1962). For a more philosophical version o£thia worry, see MlCHEL
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PuNISH (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977).
u Lewie, supra note 41, at 307-08.
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treated you as a person: rehabilitation as treatment, by contrast,
was "not a response to a person who is at fault. We respond to an
individual, not because of what he has done, but because of some
condition from which he is suffering."45 But a person who has done
wrong might not be sick; he may have chosen his wrong, and
treating him as a sick person is insulting, dehumanizing-a denial
of his status as a free, choosing, being.
However aggressively rehabilitation as treatment was attacked
in theory-and it seems clear that in the minds of most people that
it has been thoroughly defeated-it left its mark on Supreme
Court doctrine. In the 1949 case Williams v. New York, the
Supreme Court not only agreed with, but seemed to embrace the
idea that punishment had to be tailored to the criminal offender,
or "individualized."46 The idea was straight from the literature on
rehabilitation as treatment47: the effective diagnosis is one that
treats the person and his disease; there could be no "one size fits
all" prescription, because each person's need and propensity for
rehabilitation differed. 48 The statute at issue in the case, the
Court said, "emphasize(d] a prevalent modern philosophy of
penology that the punishment should fit the offender and not
merely the crime." 49 ''The belief no longer prevails," the Court
announced, as if ringing out an older, less enlightened era, "that
every offense in a like legal categocy calls for an identical
punishment without regard to the past life and habits of a
particular offender." 60
Moreover. for rehabilitation as treatment, the prescription
should be made by an expert, using all the relevant information
the expert could gather, taking into consideration "not only static
◄&Morris, supra note 34, at 83.
•• See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) (recognizing "modem concepts
individualizing puniehmentj; see also Greenholt;,; v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr.
Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 8 (1979) (explaining that the judge should make a decision that is
"best both for the individual inmate and for the community"); United States v. Grayson, 438
U.S. 41, 49 (1978) (approving Williams'e reasoning). I am indebted to Berman's account of
these casea in the discussion that follows. See Berman, supra note 28, at 388-93.
◄1See Weihofen, supra note 34, at 257 ("A rehabilitative approach is necessarily an
individual approach.j.
48 See id. ("Not every person whose conduct is deemed criminal is in need of
rehabilitation.j .
41 Williams, 337 U.S. at 247.
IO Id.
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and presently observable factors, but dynamic and historical
factors, and factors of environmental interaction and change."6 1
The expert would look "into the future for correction, re-education,
and prevention." 52 For the Supreme Court, the experts were
sentencing judges and parole officers, 53 and in Williams, the Court
maintained that the judge had to have access to a full sentencing
report (which would include, but would not be limited to,
information about the crime for which the offender was being
punished) in order to make a suitable recommendation as to
punishment. 54 The report would include "information about the
convicted person's past life, health, habits, conduct, and mental
and moral propensities." 05
The Court underlined that the reason why the judge needed
this information was so that he could recommend a punishment
that would best serve to rehabilitate and reform him. "[A] strong
motivating force" for individualizing punishment, the Court wrote,
''has been the belief that by careful study of the lives and
personalities of convicted offenders many could be less severely
punished and restored sooner to complete freedom and useful
citizenship." 56 In a footnote, the Court favorably cited a prominent
rehabilitation as treatment proponent57 and declared in the text of
51 Menninger, supra note 32, at 46.
62 Id.
"' In the pure rehabilitation as treatment model, judges would eventually surrender the
sentencing role entirely to experts. See id. at 4 7 ("Intelli g e nt jud g e s all over the country are
increasingly surrendering the onerous responsibility of deciding in advance what a man's
conduct will be in a prison and how rapidly his wicked impulses will evaporate there.j;
STITH & CABRANES, supra note 28, at 20 rAdvocates of the rehabilitative ideal would have
preferred less judicial authority over sentences and even greater authority conferred on
parole officials.").
Judges with full information (e.g., what was contained in a pre•
sentencing report) were a second-best option. See Mennin g e r, supra note 36, at 244 ("The
consistent use of a diagnostic clinic would enable trained workers to lay what they can learn
about an offender before the judge who would know best how to implement the
recommendation."); Sheldon Glueck, Principlea of a Rational Penal Code, in THEORIES OF
PUNISHMENT, supra note 31, at 279 (asserting that rehabilitation must be based upon a
complete scientific understanding of each offender).
54 Williams, 337 U.S. at 249-60.
" Id. at 245.
51 Id. at 249.
6T See id. at 248 n.13 ("It should be obvious that a proper [sentencing! . . . involves a
study of each case upon an individual basis . . . . Is the criminal a man so constituted and so
habituated to war upon society that there is little or no real hope that he ever can be
anything other than a menace to society-or is he obviously amenable to reformation?"
(quoting JOSEPH N. ULMAN, The Trial Judge's Dilemma: A Judges's View, in PROBATION
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the opinion that "[r]etribution is no longer the dominant objective
of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders
have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence." 6 8 In
order to serve the goals of rehabilitation and reform by
individually tailoring sentences, judges needed to have the
freedom to range beyond facts about the offense. 59 The Supreme
Court in Williams was signing on, at least in part, to the
rehabilitation as treatment program. 6 0 I t would reaffirm its
support again over the years. s1
The fact that Williams tied individualization in sentencing to
rehabilitative goals is important, because individualization is not
intrinsically tied to rehabilitation. Individual tailoring can be
backward-looking and retributive or forward-looking and
rehabilitative. I f the judge is looking at details about the offender
(details which may even be beyond the crime of which he was
convicted) to find out what he deserves as his punishment, then
the judge's individualizing is backward-looking: he is trying to fit
the offender to the right amount of deserved retributive
punishment. The Court has used this model in recent cases,
including one involving juvenile sentencing. 62
But i f the judge is using those same details to determine how
much rehabilitation the offender needs-as well as his fitness for
rehabilitation-the judge's individualizing is forward-looking. He
is trying to fit the offender to the right kind of "cure," given the
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 113 (Sheldon Glueck ed., 1933))).
N Id. at 248.
n See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 46, 46 (1978) (addreasing the need for
"informed judgments" concerning an offender's potential for rehabilitation).
I t seems
somewhat ironic that the Court in Williams waa affirming a dealh sentence, justified along
rehabilitative lines. But i t may be that some are beyond rehabilitation, and so deserve
death. I t may also be that death could induce some to reform, at least in the short time that
they have left.
60 See TAMASAK WICHARAYA, SIMPLE THEORY, HARD REALITY: THE IMPACT OF
SENTENCING REFORMS ON COURTS, PRISONS, AND CRIME 30 (1996) ("Penal policy in the
therapeutic state was even endorsed by the United States Supreme Court.'); Berman, supra
note 28, at 389 ("In 1949, the Supreme Court constitutionally approved [the rehabilitative]
approach to sentencing in Williams . . . . ").
11 See, e.g., Greenholtz v. lnrnatex of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 8
(1979); Grayson, 438 U.S. at 49; see also Berman, supra note 28, at 391-93 (describing
Grayson and Greenhollzin which the Supreme Court reaffirmed the coMection between
individualization and rehabilitation).
82 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2465, 2467-69 (2012).
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offender's situation. It was with this kind of ideal in mind that the
Williams Court favorably· cited rehabilitation as a goal of
punishment. It is evident, too, in the Court's emphasis on the
judge not just finding a just punishment, but also an "enlightened"
one, and helps explain why the judge needed information that
went beyond the information supplied by the guilty verdict. 63
Individual tailoring for rehabilitation lies somewhere on a
for
retribution
continuum
between
individualization
(individualization that is backward-looking) and the rehabilitation
as treatment model's ideal, which is fully indefinite sentences and
not merely indeterminate ones. 64 On the rehabilitation as
treatment model, it is not enough to simply make a prospective
judgment about someone's ability to be cured, but an ongoing one.
The sentence must be continually reevaluated, and "the convicted
offender would be detained indefinitely pending a decision as to
whether and how and when to reintroduce him successfully into
society."66 Those who are cured can be released; for those who do
not respond to treatment, we must provide for their "indefinitely
continued confinement." 66 The experts in the rehabilitation as
treatment model could not be tied to any guidelines or other
limitations as to how long sentences could be.
B. REHABILITATION AS TRAINING

The more aggressive proponents of rehabilitation as treatment
wanted a paradigm shift in how we thought of crime and
punishment, a shift that the Supreme Court at least partially
endorsed in Williams and its progeny. 67 At the limit, the shift led
e.1 Williams, 337 U.S. at 260-51.
64 By indefmite sentencing, I mean to indicate an in-principle indefinite sentence; an
indeterminate sentence can be confined within a specific range, or be subject to a maximum.
See Glueck, supra note 53, at 291 ( � e present 'indeterminate sentence' is indeterminate
only within maximum-minimum limits or embraces variations of this principle."); U11ited
States v. Watt!\, 519 U.S. 148, 165 (1997) (Stevena, J., dissenting) (aaaerting that Williams
was a case that udealt with the exercise of the sentencing judge's discretion within the
range authorized by law, rather than with rules defining the range within which discretion
may be exercised'1.
66 Menninger, supra note 32, st 44; see also Ferri, supra note 35, at 236 ('We mai11tain
that congenital or pathological criminals caMot be locked up for a definite term in any
institution, but should remain there until they are adapted for the normal life of society.").
61 Menninger, supra note 32, at 46.
87 See supra Part II.A (discussing the theory of rehabilitation as treatment).
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many to wonder whether rehabilitation as treatment was a theory
of punishment at all, and instead was a theory of what to put in
place of punishment. 6 8
But rehabilitation has over the years also taken on a more humdrum connotation, which is far from the radical ambition of
rehabilitation as treatment. What I will call "rehabilitation as
training'' emphasized not a cure for crime, but rather piecemeal
efforts at the betterment of inmates through vocational training
and education or by drug treatment. The goal was not that the
inmate be totally healed of his criminological tendencies (whatever
that would mean), but that he become more fit to reenter society
as a productive and contributing member. He would be prepared
to find a job upon release, or be able to enter and maintain a stable
relationship, or simply be more equipped to cope with day-to-day
life. For juvenile offenders, such programs could include "trade
training in metal and woodwork . . . summer camp with work and
recreational programs which keep the boys out of doors . . . [and]
agriculture and stock raising." 69 More typically, it could include
high school or college classes, or vocational skills training.
Sentences on the rehabilitation as training view, like those
made according to the rehabilitation as treatment view, still would
need to be individualized, to an extent. We would need to discover
what training programs would be appropriate for the offender, and
this required having a particularized knowledge of his background
and his capacities. The rehabilitation as training model, in short,
kept the focus on individualized punishment for the benefit of the
offender but shifted the form of rehabilitation from therapy and
treatment to training. The training might be expected to make the
defendant a productive member of society, or at least get him to
stop committing crimes (or, preferably both). 70 It did not involve
11 See WAYNER. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 28 (5th ed. 2010) ("It is perhaps not entirely
correct to call this treatment 'punishment,' as the emphasis is away Crom making him suffer
and in the direction of making his life better and more pleasant.'1.
61 United States v. Won Cho, 730 F.2d 1260, 1275 (9th Cir. 1984) ("In enacting the Youth
Corrections Act of 1950, Congress envisioned a rehabilitative program that included 'trade
training in metal and woodwork . . . summer camp with work and recreational programs
which keep the boys out of doors . . . (andJ agriculture and stock raising.' " (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 81-2979 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.S. 3983, 3987)).
70 United States v. Williams, 739 F.3d 1064, 1065-66 (7th Cir. 2014) (observing that
rehabilitation "often has rather utopian overtones--easing the defendant's transition to
community life, making him a productive, law-abiding member of society. . . . A more
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treating him as a patient in any sustained way: even the person in
drug treatment was not "sick;' but just needed help getting on his
feet.71
Nearly all versions of rehabilitation as training had their wings
clipped in the second half of the twentieth century. In a hugely
influential essay, 72 Robert Martinson surveyed over 200 studies
regarding the effects of various training programs in prison. 73
What he found was that, in the phrase that was to become famous,
"nothing work[ed]": no training program seemed to be effective in
decreasing recidivism rates.74 "With few and isolated exceptions,"
Martinson wrote, "the rehabilitative efforts that have been
reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism."76 If
the goal of training was to get inmates to be able t o deal
successfully in the real world, then the failure t o prevent
recidivism was a serious indictment of rehabilitation as training.76
It meant that time in training programs was doing nothing to curb
the behavior that got offenders in trouble in the first place.77
Prison with rehabilitation thrown in was not making anyone
better and prison might have even been making them worse.78
modest conception of rehabilitation, however, is that a defendant is rehabilitated when he
ceases commitling crimes, at least crimes of the gravity of the crime for which he was
convicted, whether or not he becomes a productive member of society.;.
71 This assumption provides the background for the Tapia decision. See infra Part ill.A; see
also Powell v. Texas 392 U.S. 514,535 (1968) (rejecting the idea of alcoholism as a "disease;.
72
There ia considerable debate over whether the inDuence of this essay is justified and
whether the essay truly did conclude what people said i t did; that i t did have an influence,
and that its influence contributed to the decline of the rehabilitative ideal, is nearly
undisputed. See Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and tM Procedural Conception of
Reswratiue Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 201 n.16 (discussing the influence of
Martinson's work and reactione to it).
n Robert Martinson, What Wor.u?-Questions and Answers About Prison. Reform, 35
PUB. [NT. 22, 24-25 (1974) (explaining the methodology of his survey).
74 Id. at 48; ree also ALLEN, supra note 10, at 57 (describing the influence of Martinson's
conclusion).
76 Martinson, supra note 73, at 25 (emphasis omitted).
71 See id. at 49 (explaining that the author's findings offer "very little re880n to hope that
we have in fact found a sure way of reducing recidivism through rehabilitation;.
Tl See id. at 47 (noting that rehabilitation and treatment to alter behavior leas than
deterrence mechanisms).
1 ' But see United States v. Hopkins, 531 F.2d 576, 584 n.51 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ('The
conclusions o f those who have critically examined programs implemented during the rise of
the era of the 'rehabilitative ideal' with regard to their efficacy in reducing recidivism and
tendency to be used to justify substantial encroachments on liberty should be carefully
considered in our rethinking of the intended goals of our system of criminal justice.
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Whether this was because prisoners could not or did not want to
rehabilitate, the programs were incapable of rehabilitating them,
or the prison environment itself was in tension with the idea of
rehabilitation-or all three--was unclear. 79
The model of rehabilitation as training subsequently became
even more modest. It did not hold out that the purpose of
punishment was training, as in: we send people to prison so that
they can enroll in vocational and educational training. Instead, it
became the idea that if offenders were going to be in prison
anyway, then it could not hurt to also give them training. It might
not help, either, but it was an acceptable alternative to doing
nothing. The purpose of punishment may not be rehabilitation (as
the rehabilitation-as-treatment people believed, and as some of the
more optimistic rehabilitation-as-training advocates proposed), but
it could be a place where some rehabilitation might occur. The fact
that rehabilitation does not work all that well should not be a
deterrent to having rehabilitation at all. As the Court put it in
Greenholtz, ''The fact that anticipations and hopes for
rehabilitation programs have fallen far short of expectations of a
generation ago need not lead states to abandon hopes for those
objectives." 8 0 Maybe rehabilitation programs worked a little, even
if they did not work "spectacularly."8 1
In his classic opinion in United States v. Bergman, Judge
Marvin Frankel gave clear form to the emerging wisdom about
rehabilitation as training. "[T]his Court," Frankel wrote, "shares
the growing understanding that no one should ever be sent to
prison for rehabilitation." 82 Nonetheless, "[i]f someone must be
imprisoned-for other, valid reasons-we should seek to make
rehabilitative resources available to him or her." 83 Rehabilitation
could remain a goal and a resource for those already in prison, but
Although one cannot help but be disillusioned by such failures, it is important not to give up
all hope. These failures may be attributable, at )east in part, to the dearth of resources
committed to making rehabilitative programs in institutions work, and the often haphazard
manner by which such programs are implemented.").
7t For a sober-eyed assessment of Nhabilitation as tnining'e failure by a current inmate,
see generally Jeremiah Bourgeoius, The lrreleuance of Reform: Mcuuration in the
Department of Corrections, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 149 (2013).
80 Oreenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979).
II See JOEL SAMAHA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 500 (7th ed. 2006).
u 416 F. Supp. 496, 499 (S.O.N.Y. 1976).
113

Id.
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it could no longer be the goal of punishment, 84 a position that
would later be codified. 85
C. R E H A B I L I T A T I O N A S M O R A L R E F O R M

There is a third model of rehabilitation that is important to
point out, and its ambitions lie somewhere in between
rehabilitation as treatment and rehabilitation as training.
Rehabilitation as reform, as I shall call it, can be helpfully
compared and contrasted with rehabilitation as treatment. Like
rehabilitation as treatment, rehabilitation as reform emphasizes
not just making the offender a more productive member of society,
but fundamentally changing him.
Unlike rehabilitation as
treatment, however, this change is not along the lines of a medical
paradigm where the offender is sick and needs to be cured.
Rather, the offender needs to be morally educated: he needs to
learn that what he has done was wrong, and to (at least) feel
remorse over it. The offender is not supposed to just "fit in," he is
supposed to become almost a different person, a "reformed" person
through a process of moral reflection. The idea of rehabilitation as
reform has not fi g u r ed much in recent jurisprudence (the exception
to this, I will argue, is Graham), although it has recently enjoyed a
renewed vogue in moral and political theory. 8 6
114See id. ("lT)he goal of rehabilitation cannot fairly serve in itself as grounds for the
sentence to confinement.;; see also Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 13-14 ("The objective of
rehabilitating convicted persons to be userul, law-abiding members of society can remain a
goal no matter how disappointing the progress. But it will not contribute to these desirable
objectives to invite or encourage a continuing state of adversary relations between society
and the inmate.").
" See 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (2006) ("The Commission shall insure that the guidelines reRect
the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for the purpose of
rehabilitating the defendant or providing the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.;.
" For good recent statements, see Zachary Hoskins, Punishment, Contempt, and the
Prospect of Moral Reform, 32 CRIM. J. ETHICS 1, 9-10 (2013) (explaining what it means to
reform a person); Steven Sverdlik, Punishment and Reform 5 (Jan.I, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript}, available at http://digitalrepository.smu.edu/hum_sci_philoaophy_research/1
(explaining that reform and rehabilitation are not identical goals, because rehabilitation
assumes that criminals are mentally ill and in need of therapy); see also WALTER MOBERLY,
THE: ETHICS OF PUNISHMENT 261 (1968) (noting that the goal of reform is to create in
prisoners "some sense of moral responsibility''); Jean Hampton, The Moral Education
Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 208, 232-33 (1984) (discussing the
interaction or moral education theory with sentencing poli c y); ANTONY DUFF, PuNISHMENT,
COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 6 (2001) (contrasting rehabilitation, which seeks to
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The idea of rehabilitation as moral reform is in fact a very old
idea, and possibly the oldest association between punishment and
rehabilitation. 87 It is at least as old as the penitentiary, where
convicts were meant to go and, in solitude, reflect on their wrongs
and show penance for them. 88 We punish with the hope that this
will induce the offender to reflect and become a morally better
person; but of course punishment is neither necessary nor
sufficient for a person to reform. You can be punished but not
reform, and you can reform without being punished. 89 Reform
does not happen by punishing, rather, it is what punishing is
supposed to spur.
It is not obvious how this reform was supposed to happen.
Perhaps being punished was enough to induce in the offender
feelings of remorse and repentance. 90 Perhaps it was through
being isolated from outside, corrupting influences that prisoners
could finally have a chance to reform. 91 Or perhaps it was a little
of both. As de Beaumont and de Toqeuveville explained in their
survey of American prisons:

improve a person's skills, capacities, and opportunities, with reform of their diepositione or
motives); Herbert Morris, A Paternalistic T M o r y of Pun.ishmen.t, in. WHY PUNISH? HOW
MUCH? 179 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011) (contrasting a paternalistic theory of punishment,
which focuses on doing good to wrongdoers, with rehabilitative theories).
I am also extremely indebted, in my exposition of the reform ideal, to an amicue brief
in the Tapia case. See generally Brief Amicus Curiae by Invitation of the Court, Tapia v.
United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011) (No. 10-5400), 2011 W L 882592.
111It is arguably present in Plato's work.
See Plato, Pun.i&hment as Cure, in.
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 37 (Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972) ("(A) just
penalty disciplines us and makes us more just and cures us Crom evil."); J.E. Mc'l'aggart,
Hegel's Theory of Puni&hmen.t, in. PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTNES ON PuNJSHMENT, supra, at
41 (noting that Hegel's theory is that punishment may cause a wrongdoer to truly repent of
hie sin).
as See the discussion by Stith and Cabranes or the -civic ideal of reformation through
punishment," in STITH & CABRANES, supra note 28, at 15 (".Associated most prominently
with the Pennsylvania Quaker physician Benjamin Rush and his friend Benjamin Franklin,
the ideal of personal reformation was at the heart of the movement to transform existing
penal institutions into more humane institutions or treatment and reform."). See also
DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE AsYLUM 85 (1971) (describing how isolation
caused convicts to consider the error of their ways).
" On this, see my Commentary: What is the point ofprisollV (St. Louis Public Radio, June
5, 2014).
ao Thia was emphasized by McTaggart, supra note 87, at 51: "[t]he aim of punishment
is . . . to produce repentance."
11 ROTHMAN, supra note 88, at 71.
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Thrown into solitude [the prisoner] reflects. Placed
alone, in view of his crime, he learns to hate it; and if
his soul be not yet surfeited with crime, and thus have
lost all taste for any thing better, it is in solitude,
where remorse will come to assail him . . . . Can there
be a combination more powerful for reformation than
that of a prison which hands over the prisoner to all
the trials of solitude, leads him through reflection to
remorse, through religion to hope . . . ?92
For rehabilitation as reform, other people, such as judges and
jailors cannot themselves directly cause moral reform. Doctors
and experts cannot do it, nor can vocational counselors or
psychologists, although perhaps they can help at the margins.
Training may be a good way to show reformation, but it is possible
to be well-trained but not morally reformed. You could be an
excellent worker or student, but a bad person. Only your own
efforts, the hard work of reflection, can lead you to remorse,
repentance, and hope.
The model of rehabilitation as reform in its expectation of what
the prisoner was supposed to achieve rivals rehabilitation as
treatment in its ambition. Your time in prison was meant to help
cure you, not in the sense that you were sick and now you are well,
but in the sense that you were morally corrupt and now you are
morally pure (or more pure). In some more aggressive versions,
the very purpose of punishment is that it can induce this reform:
we punish you so that you will reform yourself. In a less ambitious
version, rehabilitation as moral reform requires that prison should
not hinder the goal of moral reform (where punishment might be
justified on other grounds).93 At a minimum, prison should not be
a place where you came out brutalized and degraded. 94
In either its more or less ambitious versions, however, the goal
of moral reform is fundamentally incompatible with rehabilitation
as treatment. The therapeutic model dispenses with remorse and
n GUSTAVE DE BEAUMONT & ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, O N THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM IN
THE UNITED STATES AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE 22, 51 (Francis Lieber trans., Carey,
Lea & Blanchard 1833).
113See Hoskins, supra note 86, at 11 (arguing that punishment should not undermine
prospects for reform).
H Morrie, supra note 86, at 168.
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regret (should we feel guilty for having a cold or for having gout?)
and places the prisoner in the hands of a doctor. Moral reform, by
contrast, requires that the offender accept his responsibility and
strive to atone for it; he undergoes a kind of "secular penance." 96
In this respect, moral reform is often tied to retributivism, but it
is, I believe, distinct from it. Retribution at its core says that
people deserve to be punished. 96 It says nothing about whether
those who are punished believe that they are responsible or that
they should show remorse for what they have done.97 Moral
reform, by contrast, requires these things, and indeed may require
that punishment should cease after moral reform has been
achieved. 98
This model-although very old-had new life given to it in the
Graham decision. Both in rhetoric and in substance, the Court
held out prison as a place where moral reform might happen or at
least not frustrate the possibility for moral reform. 99 But first we
need to set the context for the rise of rehabilitation in Graham-in
the Court's conflicted yet ultimately skeptical view of the
rehabilitative ideal in almost all of its forms.
III. THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL IN PRACTICE I: STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION

I have already mentioned how rehabilitation in some of its
guises has appeared in older federal and Supreme Court cases.
96 R.A. Durr, Penance, Punishment, and the Limits of Community, in WHY PUNISH? How
MUCH?, supra note 86, at 179.
H See, e.g., MlCHAELMOORE, PLACINO BLAME 153 (1997).
01 Characterizing punishment as a "reformative enterprise," Duff, supra note 95, at 179,
seems fundamentally different than viewing i t ea a way or giving out "just deserts." A t best,
i t may be a condition of punishment being "reformative" that i t is only given to those who
deserve it. See also my discussion or this point in Chad Flanders, The Case Against the
C a s e Against the Death Penalty, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 696, 610 (2013).
ea Contra DUFF, supra note 86, at 111�18. I t may be thought that so-called shaming
punishments might induce a type of moral reform; I am not sure this is correct. At leaet, i t
is an open question whether shaming serves more to degrade the offender than to inspire
him to reform himself. I t ie, however, also an open question whether prison. is all in all less
For my re0ections on this, see Chad Flanders,
degrading than shaming punishments.
Shame and the Meanings of Punishment, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 609, 622 (2006).
99 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 76 (2010) (holding that the state must give
defendants "some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated
maturity and rehabilitation").

2015)

THE REHABILITATWE IDEAL

403

But discussions about the meaning of rehabilitation have played a
significant role in two recent cases besides Graham, although the
focus in these cases was on the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) and
its interpretation and use of rehabilitation. 100 Nonetheless, in
Tapia u. United States 101 and Pepper u. United States 102 (both
decided in 2011), the Supreme Court made more general, almost
philosophical, statements about the meaning of rehabilitation.
Interestingly, statements in the two cases seem to be directly at
odds with one another (Tapia seems anti- the rehabilitative ideal;
Pepper pro-). Whether the competing statements can be reconciled
in terms of a larger principle is the focus of the last section of this
Part.
The two cases also form an important backdrop for my reading
of Graham, despite the fact that they were decided after Graham.
Indeed, they form a bridge between the history of the
rehabilitative ideal and its present reality. Parts of that ideal
continue to be in play in the Court's jurisprudence, but mostly the
Court is acting against a background of pronounced hostility to
rehabilitation: a hostility that was codified in the SRA, but that
the Court also seems to share. 103 How Graham could emphasize
the ideal of rehabilitation in this context is addressed in the next
Part.
A. THE REJECTION OF REHABILITATION: TAPIA
Tapia concerned the sentencing of Alexander Tapia, who was
convicted by a jury for bringing illegal immigrants into the United
States for financial gain. 104 At sentencing, the judge gave Tapia
fifty-one months in prison, but was ambiguous as to the reasons
why she was being sentenced to that particular term. According to
the sentencing judge, the sentence for Tapia had "to be sufficient
to provide[ ] needed correctional treatment, and here I think the

100 For background on the SRA, see STITH & CABRANES, supra note 28, at 38-77.
101 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011).
102 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011).
103 See, e.g., Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2391 (describing legislative history, the SRA, and
attributing Congress's skepticism over the efiectiveneSB of rehabilitation in prison to
"decades or experience with indeterminate sentencing").
Id. at 2383.
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needed correctional treatment is the 500 Hour Drug Program." 105
The judge went on:
Here I have to say that one of the factors t h a t - I am
going to impose a 51-month sentence, . . . and one of
the factors that affects this is the need to provide
treatment. In other words, so she is in long enough to
get the 500 Hour Drug Program, number one. 106
Stated differently, the sentencing judge seemed to be indicating
that one of the main reasons (if not the main reason) that Tapia
was being given fifty-one months was so that she would be eligible
for drug treatment. 107 If drug treatment had not been possible, or
not available, Tapia would have gotten a lesser sentence. 108 The
Court found that the trial judge had erred in extending Tapia's
sentence so that she could receive drug treatment, and remanded
her case to the Ninth Circuit to determine whether Tapia's failure
to object to her punishment at sentencing meant she was without
any remedy. 109
Read narrowly, Tapia is an opinion about statutory construction;
in particular, whether § 3582(a) of the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA)
made a punishment permissible that was imposed, in part or in
whole, for the sake of a prisoner's rehabilitation. That section, in
relevant part, provided that the court, "in determining whether to
impose a term of imprisonment, and, if a term of imprisonment is to
be imposed, in determining the length of the term" should recognize
"that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting
correction and rehabilitation." 110 Justice Kagan, writing for the
Court, interpreted this to mean that a sentencing judge could not
impose or increase a convicted person's sentence in order to advance
the goal of rehabilitation. m Much like Judge Frankel's position in
105 Id. at 2385 (quotation omitted).
1119 Id. (quotation omitted).
101 Justices Sotomayor and Alito, in concurrence, disagreed with this assessment. See id.
at 2393--94 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (asserting that the District Court did not elongate
Tapia's term "beyond that necessary for deterrence").
1o1 See id. at 2385 (linking the sentence to Tapia's need Cor drug treatment).
109 Id. at 2392-93.
110 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2006).
111 Tapia, 131 S. Ct. 2391.
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the Bergman case, the SRA allowed consideration of rehabilitation
once a punishment of imprisonment had been determined on other
grounds, hut not in the formulation of the length of imprisonment or
even whether imprisonment was appropriate. 1 12 Rehabilitation
might be appropriate in choosing a punishment other than
imprisonment, that is, in rejecting prison as an option. 113 It could
not be the basis of choosing imprisonment over other alternatives or
(more importantly for the Tapia case) deciding on a longer term of
imprisonment.
But the Court sweeps more broadly in construing the SRA,
construing it as wholly rejecting almost any except the most
modest version of the rehabilitative ideal. Again, the Court is only
interpreting a statute, not giving its own independent judgment of
rehabilitation, but the emphasis on the SRA's repudiation of
rehabilitation is instructive. Quoting from and relying on its
decision in Mistretta, the Court noted that sentencing prior to the
SRA was "premised on a faith in rehabilitation." 114 That faith
required that judges and other correctional officers be permitted to
base "their respective sentencing and release decisions upon their
own assessments of the offender's amenability to rehabilitation."H 6
A prisoner was to stay in prison until he had shown that he
could safely reenter society, that is, that he had been rehabilitated.
Accordingly, release "often coincided with 'the successful
completion of certain vocational, educational, and counseling
programs within the prisons." 116 But this model "fell into
disfavor," not only because it resulted in sentencing disparities,
but more fundamentally, because many began to doubt that prison
and prison programs could reliably rehabilitate offenders (and that
officials could tell when prisoners had been successfully
rehabilitated) .117
112 See United States v. Mogel, 956 F.2d 1655, 1563 (11th Cir. 1992) ("Rehabilitative
considerations have been declared irrelevant for purposes of deciding whether or not to impose
a prison sentence and, if so, what prison sentence to impose.''), cert denied, 506 U.S. 867
(1992).
113 Indeed, the statute could be read as positively encouragingoptions other than prison if
one had rehabilitation in mind as a goal.
11• Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2386.
11a Id. (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989)).
11• Id. at 238 7 (quoting S. REP. No. 98-225, at 40 (1!183)).
117 Id. at 2387.
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I n other words, according to the Tapia Court, the SRA
effectively repudiated Williams, at least when it came to
imprisoning offenders, and by doing so pushed courts to move
beyond rehabilitation as treatment (and its reliance on expert
judgment and indeterminate sentencing) and even rehabilitation
as training (at least on any strong version of that model). us
Determinate sentencing, and not individualized sentences, was
now the order of the day: judges were constrained in picking and
choosing punishment based on facts about the offender, and about
his capacity for rehabilitation.
Rehabilitative training and
treatment could go on in prison but it could not be treated as a
goal of punishment; they were things that could occur only after an
appropriate punishment had been fixed. 119 Even then, there was
little guarantee that any "vocational, educational, and counseling
programs" 120 within prison would be successful. I f Congress
wanted courts to be able to mandate rehabilitation as training in
prison, the Court noted, it would have given them the power to
impose training or drug treatment on offenders in prison, but it
Courts can only
notably did not give them that power. 12 1
"recommend" training and treatment for offenders who are to be
imprisoned, 12 2 and Justice Kagan, in an aside, encouraged them to
do so.1 23 But they cannot require it. 124

ue See, e.g., United States v. Grant, 664 F.3d 276, 280-81 (9th Cir. 2011) ("The Court read
the statute as a broad rejection of imprisonment as a means 0£ promoting rehabilitation.").
119 See Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2389-90.
1 2 0 Id. at 2386 (quoting S. REP. No. 98-225, at 40 (1983)).
121 See id. at 2390 ("II Congress . . . meant to aUow courts to base prison terms on
offenders' rehabilitative needs, it would have given courts the capacity to ensure that
offenders participate in prison correctional programs.").
1 2 2 See id. C'A sentencing court can recommend that the [Bureau of Prisons! place an
offender in a particular facility or program.").
1 2 3 Id. at 2392 C'So the sentencing court here did nothing wrong-and probably something
very right-in trying to get Tapia into an effective drug treatment program.").
m Id. at 2393. After Tapia was decided, a circuit split quickly developed on its meaning
regarding a revocation of supervised release. See Douglas A Berman, Quick Circuit Split
on Tapias Impact for Superuised Release, SENT'O L. & POLY (July 20, 2011, 11:39 AM),
available at http:/lwww.sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2011/07/quickcircuit•split•on•tapias•impact•for•revocation•of.supervised,release.html (discusaing the split
between the First and Fifth Circuits on this ieeue).
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B. PEPPER AND THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE IDEAL
Surprisingly, in the same term as Tapia, the Court reaffirmed
its holding in Williams in terms that were almost as sweeping as
Tapia's rejection of the rehabilitative ideal. Pepper v. United
States involved a unique set of facts: Jason Pepper had pied guilty
to a conspiracy to distribute more than 500 grams of
methamphetamine. 125 He was sentenced to a twenty-four month
term in prison, an almost seventy-five percent departure from the
normal sentencing range, and five years of supervised release. 126
The Government appealed the sentence, 127 and two years after the
original sentencing decision, Pepper's original sentence was
reversed and remanded by the Eighth Circuit for resentencing. 12 B
In the meantime, Pepper served his twenty-four month prison
At his
term and began a period of supervised release. 129
resentencing hearing in 2006, Pepper and several witnesses
testified that he had, inter alia, completed a 500 hour drug
program, 130 no longer was abusing drugs, had enrolled in college
(and was getting straight As), had a part-time job, and had
reconciled with his family.m
The district court again sentenced Pepper to twenty-four
months, relying on Pepper's post-sentencing rehabilitation and
explaining "it would [not] advance any purpose of federal
sentencing policy or any other policy behind the federal sentencing
guidelines to send [Pepper] back to prison." 132 The government
appealed and Pepper's sentence was once more reversed and
remanded to the district court. 133 I n its ruling, the Eighth Circuit
explained that the district court had abused its discretion in
considering post-sentencing rehabilitation as a sentencing factor,
both because it was not "relevant" and "would create unwarranted
sentencing disparities and inject blatant inequities into the
126 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1236 (2011).
i,c Id.

m Id.
Id.
i21 Id.

l
:&
z

130 Interestingly, this seems to be the same program that was at issue in Tapia. Tapia v.
United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2385 (2011).
131 Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1236-37.
1:si Id. at 1237 (quotation omitted).
11
.t:

Id.
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sentencing process."134 At Pepper's second resentencing hearing in
2008 (and third sentencing hearing overall), Pepper and others
again testified to Pepper's continuing rehabilitation (he was still
attending school and still working, but also had recently
married).135 This time, the district court rejected Pepper's request
for a downward variance, and Pepper was sentenced to sixty-five
months.136 After losing at the Court of Appeals, Pepper appealed
to the Supreme Court.137 He won.1 3B
The Court defended the right of judges at sentencing to consider
all factors in sentencing, even evidence that was not available to
the original sentencing judge.139 I n favoring broad discretion, the
Court found its most germane precedent in Williams, the case in
which the Court had most blatantly adopted aspects of the
rehabilitative ideal. 'We have emphasized," the Pepper Court
said, quoting Williams, that "[h]ighly relevant-if not essential-to
[the] selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the
fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and
characteristics."14 D
The language the Pepper Court quoted from Williams is the
language that the rehabilitation as treatment model bequeathed to
the Court: experts and judges need to have full information and
wide latitude when sentencing, because the idea behind sentencing
is not to give a "one size fits all" punishment but to tailor or
"individualize" a punishment based on the particularities of each
offender. 14 1 As the Court also quoted from Williams, "the
punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime.''142
The best sentence is the right prescription based on an
individualized diagnosis that will lead to the offender's
rehabilitation. 143 Indeed, Pepper goes even further than Williams
1:,.c
•�
i:ia
137
131

Id. at 1237-38 (quoting 486 F.3d 408, 413 (8th Cir. 2007)).

Id.

at 1238.

Id.
Id. at 1239.

See id.
139 Id. at 1241-43.
1•0 Id. at 1240 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)).
11 See supra Part II.A.
142 Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1240 (quoting Williams, 337 U.S. at 247).
1u See Williams, 337 U.S. at 247 ("The belief no longer prevails that every offense in a like
legal category calls for an identical punishment without regard to the past life and habits of
a particular offender.").
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did, emphasizing the need to consider evidence of the offender's
character not only before but even well after the moment of
conviction. 144
Of course, the Pepper Court does not say that individualized
punishments are intrinsically related to rehabilitation as
treatment; then again, neither did the Williams Court. But recall
that rehabilitation as training also required that sentences be
individually tailored. In this regard it is revealing what additional
facts the district court in Pepper's resentencing thought especially
relevant, viz., the fact that he was attending college, held a steady
job, and had reconciled in his family. 145 In short, Pepper had
rehabilitated himself, not in the sense that he was sick and getting
better (the rehabilitation as treatment model) but in the sense that
he was well on his way to becoming a fit and productive member of
society (the rehabilitation as training model).
The inference is almost impossible to miss: Pepper was getting
a lower sentence because he was getting rehabilitated outside of
prison and so would need fewer years of rehabilitation inside
prison. The Pepper Court held as much. 146 Evidence of Pepper's
rehabilitation prior to his sentencing was relevant because it was
"highly relevant to several" of the statutorily mandated factors
judges were to consider at sentencing, including the purpose of
"provid[ing] the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training." 147 Sentences should be individualized, Pepper held, and
one of the things that matters to individualization is whether the
offender needs (or in Pepper•s case, doesn't need) rehabilitation.
Rehabilitation, in short, is a sentencing factor.
C. RECONCILING TAPIA AND PEPPER
Can the two cases-decided in the same Supreme Court T e r m be reconciled? At a high enough level of abstraction, Tapia and
Pepper go in strikingly different directions. Tapia repudiates
Williams; Pepper embraces it. As far as the interpretation of the
SRA, Tapia seems to have the better story. Indeed, Justice Alita
144 Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1241-42.
m Id. at 1242.
u, Id. at 1242-43.
10 Id. at 1242 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (2006)).
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picked out the majority's reliance on Williams in Pepper for special
ridicule. "Anyone familiar with the history of criminal sentencing
in this country cannot fail to see the irony in the Court's praise for
the sentencing scheme exemplified by Williams," Alita wrote. 148
But, he continued, "[b]y the time of the enactment of the
Sentencing Reform Act in 1984, this scheme had fallen into
widespread disrepute." 149 He rejected the Court's opinion in'
Pepper as an ill-advised "paean" to the "old regime.'' 160
More substantively, the two decisions are at odds as to whether
rehabilitation is a sentencing factor. Tapia reads the SRA and
particular provisions of it as positively removing rehabilitation as
a factor for judges to consider. 161 Pepper favors judges considering
an offender's past rehabilitation as relevant to whether he needs
further rehabilitation. 152 Trying to find a distinction between the
two uses of rehabilitation seems formalistic. We could say that
Tapia is about using rehabilitation to increase a sentence, whereas
Pepper is about using rehabilitation to decrease a sentence. But
then both are still ways of using rehabilitation as a sentencing
factor. I f prison is not an appropriate means for promoting
rehabilitation at all (as the statute at issue in Tapia suggests),
then it should not have been a relevant factor in Pepper's case.
But it seems obvious that rehabilitation was a driving factor in at
least one of Pepper's sentencing decisions: because Pepper was
already rehabilitated, he needed less rehabilitation in prison. 163 I f
Tapia is correct about rehabilitation as a sentencing factor, then
Pepper seems wrongly decided and vice versa. 164

14! Id. at 1256 (Alit.o, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Williams, 337
U.S. at 241).
141 Id. at 1256-57.
1so Id. at 1257.
141 See supra notes 114-24 and accompanying text.
m See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
153 See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
1" If we extend the logic of Pepper further, its tension with Tapia becomes even more
manifest. Suppose Pepper had done bad things prior to his conviction (he had lost his job,
or gotten a divorce, or flunked out of school), then presumably these facts would be relevant,
but relevant because they showed the need for further rehabilitation. If Pepper's good acts
are relevant to decreasing his sentence because he has already been rehabilitated, then his
had acts would seem to be relevant for the SBDle reason: because they show the need for
more rehabilitation.
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But there may be a way we can give more substance to the
seeming formalism. Suppose we take Tapia's rule not to be the
blanket one that rehabilitation cannot be used as a factor when
sentencing someone to prison; suppose, instead, we take it to be
that, because prison is bad for rehabilitation, it should not be used
to put someone in prison in the first place, or to lengthen his
sentence once there. That is, if prison is bad for rehabilitation,
then judges should never factor in someone's need for
rehabilitation when considering whether to increase his term in
prison.
By the same token, if prison is bad for rehabilitation, then
judges should factor in someone's need for rehabilitation when
considering whether to decrease his term in prison (or not to
sentence him to prison at all). In short, the SRA doesn't dictate
that judges should never consider someone's need for
rehabilitation. It dictates that judges should consider someone's
need for rehabilitation only when it means that they should get
less time in prison. The principle that emerges of out of the cases
then is: prison is bad for rehabilitation. Under this principle, both
Tapia and Pepper were correctly decided because they both did not
use rehabilitation as a factor that might increase prison time,
Tapia because it rejected a longer sentence and Pepper because it
licensed a lower sentence.
Viewed in this light, Pepper is as anti-rehabilitative as Tapia.
Both opinions are aware that rehabilitation programs are
available in prison. But such programs are only relevant, if they
are relevant at all, if prison time is going to be imposed anyway. If
punishment is to be imposed, it is probably a good thing to
commend them. The model at play here is mostly rehabilitation as
training but in the modest way Judge Frankel endorsed it. 155
Judges should be aware that rehabilitative programs are there for
prisoners, but they should not operate under the idea that prison
is being imposed for rehabilitation-whether by itself or in
conjunction with educational, vocational, or treatment programs.
At best, rehabilitation is something that should be pursued outside
156 For a reading of Tapia along these lines see William Peacock, Prison ia for Punishment,
Not Rehabilitation?, FINDLAW: U.S. FOURTH CIRCUlT (Oct. 31, 2012, 3:04 PM), http://blogs.
findlaw.com/fourth_circuit/2012Jl0/prison•is•for-punishment-not-rehabilitation.html.
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of prison (including while supervised by the criminal justice
system), but never in prison. 156
IV. THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL IN PRACTICE II: THE
CONSTITUTION

Graham was a constitutional decision and not a statutory one,
and it was decided before both Tapia and Pepper. Nonetheless, its
emphasis on rehabilitation is striking. Both Tapia and Pepper
show an awareness of the doubt; which predates those cases, about
rehabilitation that resulted in Congress passing the SRA. u;7 And
when set against other constitutional cases discussing
punishment, Graham's focus on rehabilitation is an outlier. In
Roper u. Simmons, decided before Graham and which Graham
most closely resembles, the focus was on retribution and
deterrence, and whether the death penalty was a proportional
punishment for children who are found guilty of murder. 158 It
barely mentioned rehabilitation, which, given Graham, seems
odd. 169 Death forecloses rehabilitation at least as much as life
without parole does (if not more). 160 Why was rehabilitation so
important in Graham, and equally as important, what did
Graham mean by rehabilitation?
A.

GRAHAM'S REHABILITATIVE HOLDING

The early response to Graham understandably focused on its
extension of the "evolving standards of decency" test beyond the
death penalty to sentences to life without parole. 16 1 Whether the
1541Thanks to Eric Miller for helping me to aee this point more clearly.
111 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 365 (1989) ("Serious disparities in
sentences, however, were common. Rehabilitation aa a sound penological theory came to be
questioned and, in any event, was regarded by some as an unattainable goal for most
cases." (citing NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 24-43 (1974))).
1H Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005).
ue Id. at 568-76.
""' But see Meghan J. Ryan, Death and Rehabilitation, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1231, 1282
(2013) (arguing lhat a death sentence ia not incompatible with rehabilitation); Flanders,
supra note 97, at 612-15 (same). Perhaps lhe Roper Court thought i t went without saying
that death caMot rehabilitate. But i n Graham, that fact alone--thal a punishment may
forecwse rehabilitation-does real work in showing that the punishment ia unconstitutional.
My question is: why was that work not done on Roper, or at least hinted at?
1e1 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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Court's reasoning will be extended to other sentences and other
groups (besides juveniles) still remains to be seen, and is the focus
of much good work in the area. 162 But Graham's more lasting
impact may be its renewed emphasis on rehabilitation. Indeed,
the fact that life in prison without parole foreclosed "the
rehabilitative ideal" (as the Court put it) 163 is central to its
holding. Indeed, it is perhaps the theme of the opinion, as well as
the basis of some of its more rhetorically moving passages.
Consider in this regard how the Graham Court treats
incapacitation as one of the legitimate goals of punishment, which
shows how rehabilitation emerges as a theme in the opinion. 164
Even here, prior to the Court's explicit discussion of rehabilitation
as a purpose of punishment, rehabilitation creeps in.
Incapacitation is a valid rationale for punishment, Justice
Kennedy writes, but not here, because "[t]o justify life without
parole . . . for juveniles'' requires a judgment that the juvenile will
be a danger to society forever, which is to say, a judgment that the
juvenile is incorrigible. 165 Kennedy goes on to say that a judgment
of incorrigibility will be very difficult to make.1 66 I t will be hard to
decide whether a juvenile's crime is the result of "transient
immaturity" or the result of "irreparable corruption." 167
So far, Kennedy's point is relatively modest, and for that reason
also vulnerable. The fact that it may be hard to find those who are
irreparably corrupt does not mean that no juveniles might be
irreparably corrupt, and that a legislature might rationally target
those who are. At least at this point, the argument only suggests
stricter standards or closer analysis for deciding who gets life
without parole, a point emphasized by Chief Justice Roberts in his
concurring opinion. 16 8 We do not need a categorical ban on life
without parole, just a more carefully targeted limit.
Some
1112 See, e.g., Steiker & Steiker, supra note 3, at 79-80.
ie3 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010).
184 Lynn Branham (in conversation) has stressed how rehabilitation plays multiple roles
in Graham: as part of its proportionality analysis, as part of its analysis of the purposes of
punishment, and in its discussion of a case-by-case approach to sentencing. I agree. M y
analysis here (as the text says) is illustrative, not exhaustive.
1M Graham,560 U.S. at 72.
111 Id. at 72-73.
•67 Id. at 73 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 561, 573 (2005)).
14111Id. at 86 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
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juveniles may really be incorrigible, and so we might want to
incapacitate them.
But what Kennedy says next in his opinion rules this out. For,
he writes, "[e]ven if the State's judgment that Graham was
incorrigible were later corroborated by prison misbehavior or
failure to mature, the sentence was still disproportionate because
that judgment was made at the outset." 169 That is to say, even if
incapacitation is fully warranted (and so a rational and just
punishment), the state cannot engage in it by imprisoning
juveniles in life without parole. Why? The answer, which becomes
clearer in the Court's explicit discussion of rehabilitation, is that
the state cannot foreclose the possibility at the outset that the
offender could be rehabilitated.
Incapacitation is not an
acceptable rationale for punishment because it rules out the
offender ever changing for the better. In short, rehabilitation as a
purpose of punishment trumps incapacitation, even when
incapacitation is fully justified.
Rehabilitation is the last purpose of punishment Kennedy
discusses, although (as we just saw) it shapes the discussion of the
purposes of punishment that went before it. 170 Again, as with
incapacitation, a sentence to life without parole passes a jud g m ent
on the juvenile and his "value and place in society," viz., that he is
"incorrigible" and can never "reenter the community." 17 1 It is cruel
to say to a juvenile offender that he is "irredeemable" 172 and that
he will never mature enough or be rehabilitated enough to earn
release. As the Court eloquently puts it later in the opinion, "[l]ife
in prison without the possibility of parole gives no chance for
fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with
society, no hope."l 73 This, the Court says, is cruel and unusual. 174
The Constitution requires giving juveniles the opportunity to show
that they can be rehabilitated, "some meaningful opportunity to
1et

Id.

a t 73.

no Rehabilitation figures in the proportionality analysis, too: life without parole U1
disproportionate to the juvenile's offense precisely because it expresses a judgment of
incorrigibility.
See id. {reasoning that a judgment of incorrigibility at the outset is
"disproportionate;.
111 Id. at 74.
172 Id. at 75.
m Id. at 79.
m See id. at 81-82.
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B. GRAHAMS T W O MODELS OF REHABILITATION
Graham's rhetoric is sweeping, which we might expect from
Justice Kennedy. But what does the rhetoric mean? 176 What in
particular does Kennedy mean by not giving up on the
"rehabilitative ideal"? Two models of rehabilitation seem to be
working in Graham, with one ultimately more important than the
other. Graham occasionally alludes to, and twice makes explicit,
the ideal of rehabilitation as training. But the rhetoric and the
overall thrust of Graham fit more comfortably within the ideal of
rehabilitation as moral reform.
The initial reference Graham makes to the model of
rehabilitation as training comes in its discussion of the
rehabilitative purpose of punishment. The Court cites an amicus
brief noting that those sentenced to life without parole "are often
denied access to vocational training and other rehabilitative
services." 177 Juveniles, the Court adds, "are most in needtl of these
services. 178 A little later, the Court hits the point again: "it is the
policy in some prisons to withhold counseling, education, and
rehabilitation programs for those who are ineligible for parole
consideration." 179 In other words, life without parole means not
only no hope of release, but a denial of opportunities for
rehabilitation in the form of vocational and educational programs.
When these passages are combined with the idea that juveniles
must be able to have a "meaningful opportunity" to obtain release,
the rehabilitation as training model's influence is patent: prison is
a place where juveniles, if they work at it and have the right kind
of support, can become fit and productive members of society and
so can be released into society. Denying them these services
"reinforce[s]" the judgment that the juvenile is irredeemable, what
Kennedy calls a "perverse consequence." 180
178 Id. at 75.
17' For a philosophical look at KeMedy'e rhetoric of hope, see Ristroph, supra note 14, at 75.
117 Graham, 560 U.S. at 74.
" 1 Id.
n, Id. at 79.
IID Id.
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But if the rehabilitation as training model were the only model
the Court had in mind, then the Court's opinion, I believe, would
have a very different shape and tenor. It would not just mention
that programs should not be closed off to juveniles, but it would
positively require that those programs be available to them. After
all, it would be cruel to say that juveniles should be given the hope
of release while denying them the tools they need to achieve that
release (in this way, as the Court says in a striking passage, the
prison system becomes "complicit" in the denial of opportunity18 1) .
But the Court does not entirely go this way. Instead, it explicitly
leaves it open to "the State, in the first instance, to explore the
means and mechanisms for compliance" with the Court's
instruction that juveniles must be given a "meaningful
opportunity'' to obtain release. 182 "It is for legislatures," the Court
says, "to determine what rehabilitative techniques are appropriate
and effective." 183
Note three things about the Court's phrasing here. First, it is a
matter for the state, in particular the legislature, and not the
Court, to find ways to comply with the Court's mandate. In other
words, there is no particular form or type of specifically
rehabilitative "opportunity'' that is required. Second, and more
revealingly, the state need in the end only explore means and
mechanisms for compliance. It need not, that is, actually
implement any of these means and mechanisms, at least not yet.
Indeed, one could imagine that legislatures might determine, and
even reasonably determine, that "nothing works," so that no
rehabilitative programs are offered. 18 4 Third, and most important,
what the Court is referring to is not means and mechanisms of
rehabilitation, at least not directly: the Court is referring to means
and mechanisms of release. 18 6 This is not the language of a Court
that is requiring states adopt the model of rehabilitation as
m See id. ("In some prisons, moreover, the system itself becomes complicit in the lack of
development.").
1si Id. at 75.
1&:1Id. at 73-74.
16' Again, Kennedy's opinion is careful (almost too careful): he rejects the idea that life in
prison without parole for juveniles might lock them out from rehabilitative programs. This
is bad, Kennedy says. Id. at 74. But nothing in his opinion holds that states have an
obligation, in the first place, to institute those programs.
11111See id. at 76.
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training. I t implies at most that the inmate must have at least an
opportunity to prove he has matured; this is his "opportunity," not
the opportunity for educational and vocational programs per se. In
fact, the Court's language here may just be a long way around to
saying that the longest permissible sentence for juveniles is life in
prison with the possibility of parole. 186
H this is all Graham requires, then we might worry about the
gap between Graham's rehabilitative rhetoric and its remedy; the
rhetoric of rehabilitation as training is mostly hortatory. States
post-Graham will have to give juveniles like Graham an
opportunity, eventually, for release. But they do not have to make
it any more possible in reality for juveniles to rehabilitate
themselves and so win release. ''Meaningful opportunity for
release" becomes more about the preconditions of release than
conditions of confinement, and the implementation of Graham
becomes (merely) about specifying those conditions. 18 7 All the
same, states may make rehabilitative programs available to
juveniles, but this is not required of them. 18 8 What is required is
the possibility of release, not rehabilitation and not even the
possibility of rehabilitation.
Is the rhetoric of rehabilitation in Graham empty then? Not
entirely, and not if we keep in mind that rehabilitation as training
is only one possible mode of the rehabilitative ideal. There is a
second strain in the Court's opinion, one that does not focus so
much on rehabilitative programs that the state has to offer, than
on the possibility of the offender himself undertaking his own
moral reform. Recall that in the model of rehabilitation as moral
reform that reform is not so much the result of prison vocational or
111 Thus Graham does not lead in any straightforward way t.o creating a "right to
rehabilitation." See Aaron Sussman, The Paradox of Graham v. Florida CJ11d the Juuen.ile
Justice System, 37 VT. L. REv. 381, 3 8 � n.33 (2012) (collecting citations on the "right t.o
rehabilitative treatment" (quoting Pena v. N.Y. State Div. for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203, 204
(S.D.N.Y. 1976))); see also Sally Terry Green, Realistic Opportunity for Release Equol.t
Rehabilitation: How the States Must Provide Meaningful Opportunity for Release, 16
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 13 (2011) CW[Graham] empowered the States to formuJate appropriate
and effective rehabilitative techniques.").
111 See Drinan, supra note 14, at 7 � 2 ; Sarah French Russell, Reuiew for Release:
Juvenile Offenders Stale Parole Practices, and the Eighth Amendment, 89 IND. L.J. 373,
375-77 (2014) (eitploring what the phrase "meaningful opportunity" means).
111 In the language of the Tapia opinion, Graham seems to say that probably a lot of good
can come Crom rehabilitation as training, but there is no constitutional mandate for it.
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educational programs; instead, the reform comes about from the
individual's own reflection and remorse. What the state has to do
is hold out hope for the maturation and moral reform, even if (and
perhaps especially if) it cannot compel it.
Justice Kennedy's rhetoric echoes the principles of the older
reform model of rehabilitation almost precisely. The state does not
have to give Graham access to any rehabilitative programs
(although it should not deny them to him when he is in prison).
Rather, the goal is ultimately Graham's rehabilitation of himself.
In one passage, Justice Kennedy writes that "[m]aturity''-not
prison, not training-"can lead to that considered reflection which
is the foundation for remorse, renewal, and rehabilitation." 189
And, in an especially vivid paragraph, Kennedy writes that with a
sentence of life without parole, Terrance Graham has no
meaningful opportunity to obtain release "no matter what he
might do to demonstrate that the bad acts he committed as a
teenager are not representative of his true character, even if he
spends the next half century attempting to atone for his crimes
and learn from his mistakes." 19 0 Training programs may help
Graham at the margins become a more productive member of
society, but it is only his own reflection and remorse that can lead
to his atonement.
What the rehabilitation as reform model positively prohibits are
punishments that say to the offender he cannot reform. If
punishment is to aim at reform, it cannot at the same time make
the "expressive judgment" 19 1 that a person will never reform and
be able to reenter society. In other words, if the intent behind
punishment is that the person reform, the punishment cannot
simultaneously convey the judgment that the person cannot
reform. But this judgment is what (by Kennedy's light) juvenile
life without parole expresses: that the juvenile is incorrigible. 192
Indeed, it is this disqualifying aspect of life without parole that is
the basis of the opinion's most eloquent passage: "[l]ife in prison
1u Graham, 660 U.S. at 79.
ivo Id.
111 Id. at 74.
ur.r See id. at 79 ("Maturity can lead to that considered reflection which is the foundation
ror remorse, renewal, and rehabilitation. A young person who knows that he or she has no
chance to leave prison before tire's end has little incentive to become a responsible
individual.").
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without the possibility of parole gives no chance for fulfillment
outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with society, no
hope." 193 Note what disqualifies the punishment in the first
instance: the judgment that the punishment makes, viz., that the
offender is without hope of reform. The punishment is not wrong
for what it does to the offender, but for what it says to him, at the
outset, about his possibility for moral reform. 194
This rhetoric matches precisely the rhetoric of rehabilitation as
moral reform. AB Jean Hampton puts it in her article on
punishment as moral education, the state "must never regard any
one it punishes as hopeless, insofar as it is assuming that each of
these persons still has the ability to choose to be moral." 195 Or
consider also Antony Duff a statement of the moral reform view as
one which believes that "we can never have morally adequate
grounds-nothing could count as morally adequate grounds-for
treating a person as being beyond redemption." 196 Because life
without parole regards juveniles as "hopeless" and treats them as
"beyond redemption," it is prohibited as a punishment. I t is one
thing i f a punishment denies juveniles training. I t is quite another
thing if it denies juveniles hope and "impl[ies] that those subject to
[life without parole] are to be permanently and irrevocably
expelled from ordinary community with their fellow citizens." 197
Thus, Graham's basic rehabilitative holding: the state cannot
discourage a person from reforming by how it sentences. And i f
the state does not discourage reform, reform may happen, perhaps
just by dint of juveniles growing older and maturing. ''Maturity" is
another key word in Graham, and it too fits with the model of
rehabilitation as moral reform. 198 The state cannot make you
"mature"; it is a process one undergoes, more or less actively, by
In fact, too much
slowly taking responsibility for oneself.

193
1114

Id.

Of course, there may be other things tha.t may also suggest a person cannot reform,
such as lack or decent prison conditions as well as inadequate opportunities for
rehabilitative training. The point now, however, is that the Court treats the message sent
by life in prison without parole as the clearest and moat salient expression of a person's
inability to reform.
195 Hampton, supra note 86, at 231.
11111R.A DUFF, TRIAI.S AND PUNISHMENTS 266 (1986).
191 Duff, supra note 96, at 185.
198 Graham, 560 U.S. at 73.
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interference can end up hindering one's moral growth. At the
same time, the state cannot announce that you will simply never
reform, which it does (Justice Kennedy says) by saying you can
never be released. 199
Now we may have a worry about the logic of this argument.
According to the model of rehabilitation as reform, nothing stops
reform from happening in prison (through reflection and maturity)
and indeed, one might be reformed in prison and yet never be
released. 200 Moral reform, in other words, is a good in itself, even
if it does not have release as its eventual reward. Indeed, if
offenders reform only for the sake of being released, we may
wonder whether this might corrupt their efforts at moral reform
not only by encouraging the pretense of reform when none has
occurred, but more generally by giving offenders the wrong
incentives to reform: offenders should show remorse because they
are remorseful, not because they want to get out of jail.201
On purely moral reform grounds, there does not seem to be any
disjunct between remaining in prison and being reformed (nor for
that matter, need there be any disjunct between being sentenced
to death and being morally reformed 202) . You can live in jail and
die in jail, and meanwhile undergo an amazing moral
transformation.2°3 You may be sentenced to death, and show
contrition prior to your execution, and be a morally changed
person. All this seems possible, and so raises the question of
whether offenders need the possibility of release for moral reform
to be possible.
But what is important in Graham may be less about release per
se and more about the message that the impossibility of release
sends: the state saying that it will never release you seems to

' " See id. at 72 (reasoning that this sends a message that a "juvenile is incorrigible").
200 See supra notea 86-88 and accompanying text.
201 See Hampton, supra note 86, at 234 (noting the difficulty in determining whether an
apparently repentant criminal is truly repentant or is faking repentance).
:?>
l 2 See supra note 160 (reasoning that the death penalty is not incompatible with
rehabilitation).
203 In addition, you may acquire all sorts of vocational skills-that is, you may be fully
successful at realizing the ideal of rehabilitation as training-yet only be able to use those
skills in prison.
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entail that you will not and cannot be reformed. 204 By the same
token, saying that the state must give you a chance of being
released strongly suggests that you can be morally reformed.
What is important is that the state give you hope rather than a
firm guarantee of release. 206 Some juveniles may not, in fact, ever
be released and so their hopes will remain just that; but they
cannot be denied hope at the outset. 206 Indeed, the judgment at the
outset is the main wrong of sentencing an offender to life without
parole and constitutive of that judgment is disallowing an
meaningful opportunity for release. 207 The real wrong is not that
offenders will not be able to reform themselves if they spend their
lives in prison (it is possible that they could). The real wrong is
that the state, by saying some offenders are unfit to join the
community ever is making a rather strong statement that those
offenders can never reform. The rehabilitative holding in Graham
is not that the state must rehabilitate, but it cannot rule out the
possibility of rehabilitation taltlng place.
That this is a rather constrained vision of rehabilitation can be
shown by the fact that rehabilitation as moral reform is compatible
with the "prison is bad for rehabilitation" principle of Tapia and
Pepper. Tapia and Pepper could be reconciled because they both
said that one could never sentence someone to more prison time
because that person needed more rehabilitation. 208 Prison just
could not (reliably) be counted on to rehabilitate people. Note,
though, Justice Kennedy does not require that prison rehabilitate
juveniles. 20 9 Rehabilitation programs in prison are nice, but not
required by the Constitution. 210 Nor does prison in general have to
be a place where people usually get better. Nothing in Graham
entails that prison is good for rehabilitation, and that juveniles
204 See Graham, 660 U.S. at 76 (asserting that the Eighth Amendment "forbid[s) States
from making the judgment at the outset that those offenders never will be fit to reenter
society").
206 Note that the state does not necessarily deny hope by failing to provide rehabilitative
programs.
21141 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 76 (recognizing that s juvenile convicted of a non-homicide
crime may never be released, consistent with the Eighth Amendment).
207

Id.

2oa Id.
209 See id. (requiring only a "meaningful opportunity to obtain release").
2•0 See id. at 73-74 (noting that determining whether programs are effective and

appropriate is the province of the legislatures).
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should be incarcerated because incarceration will rehabilitate
them. Graham is not a departure from Tapia and Pepper in the
end; it accepts their skepticism about the desirability of prison as a
place for rehabilitation. It only says that a sentence to prison
cannot be one that denies any hope that they will reform.
Whether the odds of reform are high or (more probably) low is in a
way beside the point. The state cannot by its sentencing rule out
moral reform and release; this the model of rehabilitation as
reform forbids. The rest, which is a lot (almost everything), is on
the offender. 2n
C. APPLYING GRAHAM AND REHABILITATION AS MORAL REFORM

Miller u. Alabama, the follow-up case to Graham that required
individualized sentencing for juveniles convicted of homicide, did
not extend Graham very far. It did not strike down life without
parole for juveniles altogether, as perhaps the logic of Graham
dictated. 212 If states cannot make the judgment "at the outset"
that juveniles convicted of gruesome and terrible nonhomicide
crimes are "incorrigible" and ''beyond redemption," how does this
change for homicide crimes? Instead, Graham focused on the
possible disproportion between the culpability of juvenile
murderers and life in prison without parole.
In this regard, Miller is a case about the individualization of
punishments in the (old) retrospective, retributive sense, and not
in the prospective, rehabilitative sense. 213 Youth is relevant in
figuring out what the offender deserves for what he or she did, not
because it may be relevant in predicting what he or she might
become. 214 Justice Kagan in Miller says almost nothing about the
possible future rehabilitation of offenders. She is not worried
about expressing the judgment that some juveniles will be beyond
redemption, because some of them will be; that is, some of them
211 Pushed to its limit, the logic of Graham leads to a kind of paradox. Graham says that
the possibility of reform in prison must be left open. A t the same time, prison is a place
where reform is very difficult. I return to this paradox in my conclusion.
212 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. C l 2455, 2463-64 (2012).
2,a Perhaps not surprisingly, both Tapia and Millerwere written by Justice Kngan. Tapia
is hostile to extending punishment for rehabilitation; Miller hardly makes use of
rehabilitation, mentioning i t only in passing. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468 (briefly noting
that "mandatory punishment disregards the possibility of rehabilitation;.
2u Id.
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will really deserve to be in prison for the rest of their lives, and die
in prison.210 She is worried, rather, that the state be certain that
those who are sentenced to die in prison will be the right ones.2 16
Does Graham then lack any bite, any promise for real change?
Miller suggests that it may and that even extending Graham to
categorically prohibit life in prison without parole for juveniles
convicted of homicide is not in the cards. 217 Those juveniles who
kill may indeed be fairly judged to be incorrigible at the outset, and
be denied hope, although this will require an individualized
finding. Nonetheless, we might speculate on some areas where
Graham might have some influence even if (or because)
rehabilitation means "rehabilitation as reform.''
1. Shorter and Lesser Punishments. If Miller suggests that the
rehabilitative ideal will not travel all the way upward to eliminate
all punishments that impose life in prison without parole, 218 there
is still a possibility that it might affect some lesser sentences,
including non-prison sentences. These sentences would be ones in
which a judgment was made that the offender would neuer reform,
no matter the remorse he felt or the efforts at atonement he made.
Graham said that life without the possibility of parole entailed
this judgment, 219 but there may be other punishments that also
imply incorrigibility. Based on Graham, these cases might also be
candidates for cruel and unusual punishment, because they too
would give up the rehabilitative ideal.
211 See id. at 2469 (recognizing that a eentencer might still sentence a juvenile to life in
prison).
211 Comparing Graham to Miller suggests a final way in which Graham subscribes to yet a
Graham's ultimate
thud rehabilitative ideal, this time, rehabilitation BB treatment.
prescription for juveniles is not only an individualized sentence: i t is an indefinite sentence
subject to proof of rehabilitation. O f course, the rehabilitation the Court in Graham is
interested in is the moral reform of the offender (his maturity, his remorse, and his
atonement Crom reflection), and to a lesser extent, proof that the juvenile can reenter
society as a productive and contributing member. I t is not proof that the offender hes been
"cured" of his antisocial "sickness," as the rehabilitation as treatment model held. Still,
Graham says that i t is only through rehabilitation that the juvenile offender can be
released. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010). Until then, he or she must remain in
jail indefinitely and possibly until death.
m A t least, in the short term. The logic of Graham on rehabilitation, I think, leads
inevitably to the conclusion that all life without parole punishments for juveniles are
unacceptable. That Miller does not embrace this conclusion shows that the Court is not
ready to extend Graham's logic.
219 See supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text.
2 1 , Graham, 560 U.S. at 72,
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One possible extension of Graham (which may hardly seem an
extension at all) is to apply i t to sentences that are de facto life
sentences.
Graham read very narrowly would apply only to
sentences of life without parole and not to sentences of years (and
Justice Alita cautioned that this is all Graham should have been
taken to mean 220) . But what of a sentence of one hundred years
without the possibility of parole to a sixteen year old-isn't that the
functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence? Or, to put
i t in terms of moral reform: does not such a sentence also make the
judgment that the person is beyond reform? A California court in
2012 was the first to rule that a sentence that allowed a sixteen
year old a parole hearing only after 100 years was
unconstitutional, finding that Graham applied to both ''life
without parole or equivalent de facto sentences." 22 1 Other courts
have followed; some have found even shorter sentences to be de
facto life without parole sentences. 222 How to fix exactly how long
is too long, however, remains an area of contention among state
courts. 223
Another, related extension of Graham involves lifetime
punishments that do not involve incarceration.
Consider a
juvenile sex offender who is required to register for the rest of his
life, where no showing of rehabilitation could ever be sufficient to
remove the registration requirement. IT sex offender registration
210 Id. at 124 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("Nothing in the Court's opinion afl'ecta the imposition
or a sentence to a term or years without the poHibility of parole.").
221 People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 295 (Cal. 2012).
222 Compare Floyd v. State, 87 So. 3d 45, 45-47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that an
eighty.year sentence, with the first opportunity for release at age eighty-five amounted to a
life sentence), a11d Adams v. State, No. 1011-3225, 2012 W L 3193932, at •2 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. Aug. 8, 2012) (holding that a sixty-year sentence with the ftrSt opportunity for release
around age seventy-six amounted to a life sentence), with Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546,
552 (6th Cir. 2012) (declining to apply Graham to consecutive, fixed-term sentences); State
v. Kasie, 265 P.3d 410, 415 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (same); Henry v. State, 82 So. 3d 1084,
1089 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (same), and Angel v. Commonwealth, 704 S.E.2d 386, 40102 (Va. 2011) (holding that a state statute permitting prisoners who are sixty or older and
who have served at least ten years of their sentence to petition ror conditional release
provides the "meaningful opportunity for release" required by Graham).
:w See, e.g., People v. Lucero, No. U C A 2030, 2013 WL 1469477, at •4 (Colo. App. Apr. 11,
2013) ("Defendant argues on appeal that, statistically, 'serving 20 years in prison takes 16
years off life expectancy,' thereby decreasing his natural life expectancy 'by about 32 years'
before he becomes eligible for parole. According t.o his calculation, hia life expectancy is only
forty-two years, and therefore the point a t which he obtains his first opportunity for parole
exceeds that expectancy.").
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is properly considered part of a punishment, 224 then could a
lifetime registration requirement also give up on the
"rehabilitative ideal"? A court in Ohio found that a lifetime
registration requirement did exactly this, although it focused more
on how registries might make it harder for people to find work, or
to integrate into the community. 225 A clearer route might have
been to note how the fact that the ban could never be lifted, no
matter i f there were proof of moral reform, was in fact a judgment
that the offender would never reform, and that the state would
The problem with
always have to keep an eye on him.
emphasizing the practical difficulties of reintegration is that it
could plausibly be said that the original conviction was the
problem, not the registration. 228 I t is better to hold that the state
could not rule out ex ante the possibility of moral reform by such a
sentence, however difficult it might be in practice. In other words,
the problem with the rehabilitation as reform reading of Graham
is not so much the obstacles to rehabilitation but the judgment the
state makes at the outset that moral reform can never happen.
Such an analysis might be extended to other, permanent
disabilities offenders might face even after they are releasedbans that prevent ex-felons from voting for instance. 227
22' See, e.g., Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1007, 1014 (Alaska 2008) (reasoning that a sex
offender registry was "punishment" for purposes of the ex post facto clause analysis under
Alaska constitution).
226 See I n re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729, 743 (Ohio 2012) ("Finally, as to the final penological
goal-rehabilitation-we have already discuaaed the effect of forcing a juvenile to wear a
statutorily imposed scarlet letter ea he embarks on his adult life. 'Community notification
may particularly hamper the rehabilitation of juvenile offenders because the public sti g m a
and rejection they suffer will prevent them &om developing normal social and interpersonal
skills-the lack of those traits [hes) been found to contribute to future sexual offenses.'"
(quoting Michele L. Earl-Hubbard, The Child Sex Offender Registration Laws: The

Punishment, Property Depriuation, and Unintended Results Associated with the Scarlet
Letter Laws of the 1990s, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 788, 856-56 (1996))).

228 See, e.g., Doe, 189 P.3d et 1011 (considering the argument that deleterious effects of
registry ere attributable not to registry, but to the conviction for sex offense).
221 See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 64, 57 (1974), where the respondents raised the
rehabilitative ideal ea part of their argument:
Pressed upon us by the respondents, and by amici curiae, ere contentions
that these notions ere outmoded, and that the more modern uiew is that it
is essential to the process of rehabilitating the a-felon that he be returned
to his role in society Be a fully participating citizen when he has completed
the serving of his term.
ld. (emphasis added).
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2. Prison Conditions. Above, I said that Graham does not
require that states provide rehabilitative training to juveniles; the
most it requires is an opportunity far release. 228 There is a gap
between the requirement of a "meaningful opportunity" for parole
and any possible means to achieve that goal. This gap is
problematic only i f we think of rehabilitation as training; it is not
as problematic i f we think of rehabilitation as moral reform.
Moral reform is in the end something the offender has to do on his
own, by reflection and by atonement. Moral reform is nothing that
a vocational or educational program can bring him to if he does not
want to be brought to it. In terms of actual, positive requirements,
Graham and the moral reform model may allow states to get off
the hook to a significant degree.
What rehabilitation as moral reform may require is that prison
conditions not be so degrading and dehumanizing that they also
"send a message" that moral reform is impossible. Graham, in
other words, may set a floor to what the state can and cannot do.
What Graham prohibited was, at bottom, the "expressive
judgment" by society that a juvenile was incorrigible. 229 This
message is sent by a sentence of life in prison without parole: it
says, no matter how much you change, you are still irredeemable
in society's eyes. 230 But a life without parole sentence might not be
the only way society might send such a message. Degrading or
dehumanizing prison conditions might also express that judgment;
they also might express to the offender that no matter how much
he changes, society will nonetheless treat him as incorrigible and
beyond redemption. 231 Bad conditions, too, can deprive an offender
of hope just as certainly as a lifetime prison sentence may. Here,
we can give a deeper meaning to Justice Kennedy's statement that
the prison system "itself becomes complicit in the lack of [the
offender's) development" 232 - not by depriving him of rehabilitative
training, but by removing any possibility that prison is a place
where he can be reformed, and where the judgment of
22& See supra Part IV.A.
2."t The message may be reinforced by a Jack of rehabilitative programs for the offender;
but the message ia, in the first instance, conveyed by the punishment itself.
230 Graham v. Florida, 660 U.S. 48, 74 (2010).

u 1 Id.
m Id. at 79.
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incorrigibility is "reinforced by the prison term." 233 A s one moral
reform theorist put it, a punishment cannot aim at "degrading or
brutalizing a person" because this is "not conducive to moral
awakening but only to bitterness and resentment." 234
In this way, Graham may relate to litigation against cruel and
unusual prison conditions, and not just to litigation against other
cruel and unusual sentences. 236 Prisoners may not have a
constitutional right to rehabilitation,236 but they may have a right
not to be prevented from ever achieving moral reform by
conditions which treat them as incorrigible and "beyond repair." 237
As Alice Ristroph has written, this "negative" holding of Graham
"could lead to greater scrutiny of solitary confinement, security
classifications, and other dimensions of prison conditions that
render a sentence more severe without necessarily extending its
duration." 238 This is especially true if we treat rehabilitation as on
a par with retribution as a purpose for punishment. For
retribution, harsh conditions may be part of the punishment. 239
But rehabilitation as moral reform may put a constraint on how
harsh conditions can he: they cannot be so harsh that they in effect
judge the offender to be beyond reform, because they make it
impossible that he could ever reform. 240
233

Id.

Morris, supra note 86, at 158; see also Mary Sigler, By the Light of Virtue: Prison Rape
arid the Corruption of Character, 91 lOWA L. REV. 561, 604-06 (2006) ("[I)t is indecent to
�

consign human being& t.o an environment where they are likely to be degraded . . . . ").
2:111 See generally LYNN S. BRANHAM, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, in CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND POLICY OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 769 (9th ed. 2013).
Z3a See Padgett v. Stein, 406 F. Supp. 287, 296 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (--i'he court rejects the
contention that convicted prisoners have a constitutional right to receive meaningful
rehabilitative treatment."); see also JOHN W. PALMER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
PRISONERS 222 (9th ed. 2010) (noting the refusal of courta to recognize this as a
constitutional right).
m Graham, 560 U.S. at 69 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) {plurality
opinion)).
l Ristroph, supra note 14, at 77.
:28
2�9 See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 462 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (recognizing that certain
conditions "are part of the penalty that criminal offenders must pay"). I do not think that
this is the only--or the best-way of characterizing retributivism, as I detail in my article,
Chad Flanders, Retribution and Reform, 70 MD. L. REV. 87 (2010).
240 See IAN CRAM, A VIRTUE LESS CLOISTERED: COURTS, SPEECH, AND CONSTITUTIONS 154
(2002) (describing conditions in overcrowded juvenile detention centers where children were
"handcuffed to iron pipes for extensive periods" and concluding "(i]n short, the rehabilitative
ideal was not realised in practice").
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But we should be careful, given the Court's past jurisprudence
in this area and what it will accept as appropriately
"rehabilitative.'' In Beard u. Banks, 241 for example, the Court
seemed to endorse (or at least refused to condemn) a prison plan of
"rehabilitati[on] . . . through deprivation," 242 in which misbehaving
prisoners were deprived of magazines and other reading
material. 243 "Any deprivation of something a prisoner desires,"
according to the broader theory, "gives him an added incentive to
improve his behavior."244 Such crude efforts at behavior control
come close to being dehumanizing, to say nothing of their limited
"rehabilitative" potential. And yet this is only the tip of the
iceberg of harsh prison conditions which make surviving, let alone
reforming, in prison barely possible. 246 Indeed, under the guise of
rehabilitation, prison may become harsher rather than more
humane. 246 In the abstract, the ideal of moral reform may prohibit
this; practice may be something entirely different. 247
3. Adults. In Roper, the Court emphasized how different
juveniles were from adults: in terms of their brain development,
their susceptibility to influence by others, and most ambiguously,
their lack of a fully formed "character."248 On the one hand, all of
these things made juveniles less culpable for their crimes, a theme
that also is present in Graham. 249 On the other hand, and this is a
theme present in Graham but not in Roper, this state of
"undevelopedness" might make juveniles more and not less
capable of rehabilitation: they are not yet who they will be; they
can mature, and by maturing, show that they are not inevitably
what their crime might indicate them to be. 260 They are better
m 548 U.S. 521 (2006).
Id. at 547 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
243 Id. at 526.
244 Id. at 546.
m It also shows the dangers of leaving it to legislatures to determine what rehabilitative
programs work, for nothing in Graham prevents legielatures Crom presenting
wrehabilitation through deprivation" as one oC the means or modes of realizing the
"rehabilitative ideal."
2,e Cf. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563 (1974) ("With some, rehabilitation may be
best achieved by simulating procedures of a free society to the maximum possible exuint;
but with others, it may be essential that discipline be swift and sure.").
m See infra Part V.
:41 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005).
u, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68-69 (2010).
uo Id.
2•2
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than that, or rather who they are is not yet who they might be over
time, and through rehabilitation. By comparison, adults are who
they are and so may be more culpable and, by the same token, less
Adults are to be punished;
capable of future rehabilitation.
children are to be rehabilitated. 26 1 Juveniles, in the language of
Graham, have a greater "capacity for change." 252 Adults and
children, from the standpoint of rehabilitation, are fundamentally
different. 253
But i t is not clear that the contrast stands i f we use the model of
rehabilitation as moral reform, viz., that i t will be easier for
children to reform themselves, to reflect, and to show remorse for
what they have done and harder for adults. Could not moral reform
be equally possible for both of them? To be sure, i t may be easier for
some children and harder for some adults. But as a generalization,
i t seems wrong to judge children as always more capable of moral
Some kinds of
reform and adults as always less capable.
sophisticated moral reform may even be impossible for children,
that is, certain level of maturity may be necessary even to start the
process of moral reflection. 254 Even a type of moral conversion
seems possible for the most hardened of adults. More generally,
contemporary moral reform theorists tend to insist that we should
not treat any person "beyond civic redemption." 256 I f this is right,
the rehabilitation as a purpose of punishment cannot be limited to
sentences that involve juveniles. Whether a punishment leaves
open the possibility of moral reform should be a constraint on all
punishments: we should not give up on anybody. Again, what this
entails may be very limited, at least in terms of the sentences i t
251 Thie eeeme to be a fundamental premiee of the juvenile justice system. See, e.g.,
Carissa Byrne Hessick & Judith M. Stinson, Juveniles, S u Offenses, and the Scope of
Substantiue Law, 46 TEX. TECH. L. REV, 5, 9 (2013} ("The juvenile justice system was created
over a century ago. The goal was to provide children, who were understood to be different
from adults, with an opportunity for rehabilitation, rather than puniahment. When a
juvenile commits what would be cla&&ilied as a crime i f committed by an adult, that conduct
is labeled 'delinquent,' and the juvenile justice system responds." (footnotes omitted)); see
also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967) (Black, J., concurring) (noting that the belief that
a child is "essentially good" means that a child is to be "treated" and "rehabilitated" rather
than punished (internal quotation marks omitted}).
:w Graham, 560 U.S. at 74.
:w Id. at 79.
u . Graham seems to acknowledge this. See id. (''Maturity can lead to that considered
reflection which is the foundation for remorse, renewa1, and rehabilitation.").
256 Duff, supra note 95, at 186.
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applies to. It may only apply to life in prison without parole
sentences for juveniles or adults, because only that particular
sentence expresses the judgment that the person is irredeemable.256

V. CONCLUSION
Graham was decided long after the rehabilitative ideal had
fallen out of favor. It had stopped, for the most part, acting as an
ideal and became more of a side consideration to other, more
"weighty" purposes of punishment such as retribution and
deterrence. Graham does not, and cannot, by itself revive the
rehabilitative ideal, and I have argued anyway that Graham's
version of rehabilitation is rather modest. It does not entail any
positive obligation on the state's part to rehabilitate the offender;
it does not mandate any vocational or educational programs. It
was decided against a backdrop of legislative and judicial hostility
to the idea of prison as a place for rehabilitation, and it does not
directly repudiate that hostility. Rather, it only says that society
cannot pass the judgment that people will not rehabilitate
themselves in prison. It has to hold out the hope, at least for
juveniles, that they will be able to reform themselves while they
are in prison.
But Graham has, if only by the centrality of the concept of
rehabilitation in its holding, put rehabilitation back on the agenda.
It was, at the least, a relatively surprising development, although
it remains to be seen what actual impact its emphasis on the hope
of rehabilitation will have. There are some stirrings in the lower
courts, but they are just that: stirrings. Nor has the decision led
much in the way of sustained academic reflection on the
"rehabilitative ideal." 257 Moreover, we should not, I think,
dispense with skepticism about the two problems that led many to
discard the rehabilitative ideal. Identifying rehabilitation as
l M See William W. Berry Ill, More Different Than Life, Less Different Than Death: The
Argument for According Life Without Parole its Own Category of Heightened Review Under
the Eighth Amendment After Graham v. Florida, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1109, 1112 (2010). For one
court's rejection of Graham's application to adults, see Commonwealth v. Batts, 66 A.3d
286, 291 (Pa. 2013) (children are difi'erent ror purposes of sentencing in Miller and
Graham),
1s1 But cf. Ristroph, supra note 14, a t 75-76 (analyzing Graham's relation to the
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reform is one thing, and a necessary step; but endorsing it is quite
another thing.
First, we should consider whether rehabilitation as moral
reform is a worthy ideal in itself. Should the state aim to have
offenders pursue remorse, reflection, and atonement? Is this even
a valid goal for a liberal state?258 Or should the state only
imprison with a view towards deterring criminals and protecting
society?269 Worries about manipulating offenders, to get them to
believe the right things, plagued the model of rehabilitation as
treatment. Similar worries might be raised about rehabilitation as
moral reform, which displays an intense interest in molding the
attitudes, emotions, and beliefs of the offender; in short, in shaping
the offender's soul.260 Moral reform is something we might take up
quo members of a religious community or a family; it may be less
appropriate as a goal that the state pursues.
Second, and perhaps more profoundly, we might still worry
whether prison can work as a place for rehabilitation at all.
Rehabilitation as reform removes the burden on the state to
supply offenders with rehabilitative services; at least, it does not
mandate them, although if they are present, the state cannot deny
them to juveniles. I have suggested that rehabilitation as moral
reform also should not condone brutalizing and degrading prison
conditions: these, too, can express a jud g m ent that an offender is
"irredeemable." But is even this sufficient? Tapia, especially,
displayed a profound skepticism-both legislative and judicialthat prison could be at all compatible with rehabilitation.261
Prison was not to be used for rehabilitation, period. Graham, by
contrast, seems to depend on the idea that at least rehabilitation is
generally possible in prison. This is not inconsistent with thinking
prison is not the best place for reform, but it is in some tension
with it.
Suppose that we have good reason to doubt that even the best
prison could be a place for rehabilitation as moral reform; suppose
I raised such a worry about Duff's philosophy o f punishment in a review of one of his
books. See Chad Flanders, Book Review, 113 ETHICS 149, 150 (2002) (reviewing DUFF,
supra note 86).
2511 See generallyChad Flanders, Can RetributfoismBe &wed1, 2014 BYU L. REV. 309.
260 See, e.g., Duff, supra note 95, at 174 (contrasting liberal values with values that (t)o
put it crudely . . . have to do with the soul, with our inner spiritual or moral condition").
211 See supra Part Ill.A.
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we even thought that most of the time prison positively hinders a
person's project of moral reform.
We would then be simply
repudiating the vision of those who founded the penitentiary, and
who thought that confinement and meditation could be a path to
moral development and maturity, and who thought more generally
that prison and punishment could cause one to reform. I f we
depart with the vision of prison as a place for moral reform, then
we might think that the best thing for juveniles (and for
everybody) is to find ways to keep them out of prison altogether,
except when this was necessary to protect society. Giving up on
this might mean giving up on the hope of moral reform in prison.
But if prison is a bad place for reform in general, that was a false
hope anyway. Deciding whether to extend Graham means, first,
deciding whether we should hold out that hope.

